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Abstract
The present study experimentally investigated the effects of recalling romantic relationship
memories on forecasts for future romantic relationships for people of different attachment
orientations. I assessed 133 college students not in a romantic relationship at the time of the
study for their attachment group membership and asked them to recall and write about either
their most vivid positive or negative romantic relationship memory. I measured the effects of
recalling the memory on mood and asked participants to make a series of predictions, or
forecasts, concerning the quality of an imagined future relationship in which they were a part.
I expected secure individuals’ lack of defensive processing would lead to mood changes
congruent with the valence of the memory they recalled, but that their stable positive
relationship attributions would result in uniformly positive forecasts. I expected dismissive
individuals to be emotionally indifferent to their memories and consistently negative in their
forecasts. Finally, I hypothesized that preoccupied individuals’ hypervigilance to relationship
information would lead to memory-congruent mood changes that would carry over to
differentiate the quality of their forecasts. I generally found support for my hypotheses.
Secure individuals’ mood changes differed dependent on the memory they recalled, but their
positive forecasts did not. Memory valence did not change or differentiate dismissive
individuals’ mood, but memories unexpectedly did affect the quality of dismissive
individuals’ forecasts. Preoccupied individuals, finally, did experience mood changes as
expected, and their forecasts generally changed congruent with the valence of the memory
they recalled. Overall, secure individuals’ forecasts of an imagined future relationship were
more positive than their insecure counterparts’.
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Romantic Relationship Memory Effects on Future Romantic Relationship Forecasts:
Differences by Attachment
It is a central tenet of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) that past
relationship experiences guide those of future relationships. Indeed, the body of attachment
research thus far supports this contention, revealing connections between individuals’ earlier
attachment and current relationship characteristics (Fraley, 2002; Waters, Weinfield, &
Hamilton, 2000). However, we understand little of the mechanisms behind these patterns,
particularly in the realm of romantic relationships (Furman & Winkles, 2011). Although
styles of attachment reliably predict the experiences of individuals in romantic relationships
(e.g., Feeney & Noller, 1990; Heffernan, Fraley, Vicary, & Brumbaugh, 2012; Simpson,
1990), we still do not fully understand by what means these patterns are perpetuated. One
possibility is that attachment shapes the autobiographical memories individuals carry from
earlier relationship experiences (Feeney & Cassidy, 2003; Philippe, Koestner, & Lekes,
2013; Simpson, Rholes, & Winterheld, 2010), and that these memories color expectations
and beliefs about new relationships, affecting behavior (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, &
Khouri, 1998; Schacter & Addis, 2007).
The present study experimentally investigates the effects of emotional memories from
past romantic relationships on mood and predictions, or forecasts, about future relationships,
and whether these effects differ depending on predominant attachment style. Examining how
individuals of different attachment orientations forecast future romantic relationships and
how those forecasts are affected by an arousing relationship memory can inform how
attachment and autobiographical memories interact to inform relationship functioning.
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Broadly, this study will shed light on cognitive and emotional mechanisms underlying
attachment-related differences in romantic relationships.
Attachment Theory and Romantic Relationships
One way to conceptualize romantic relationships is as an attachment process.
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) is an evolutionary, ethological model of
human relationships originally designed to explain and predict mother-child interactions.
Attachment theory postulates that a human’s first relationships (most pertinently with a
primary caregiver, often the mother; Ainsworth, 1979) lay the framework for social
interactions, and this framework reverberates throughout a lifetime. In adulthood, attachment
anxiety and avoidance (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) commonly conceptualizes patterns
of attachment, where the co-occurring degree of each dimension denotes an individual’s
classification. High attachment anxiety suggests fears of rejection and abandonment manifest
as excessive worry over a partner’s availability and attention. Low attachment anxiety, in
contrast, indicates more confidence in the beneficence of a partner’s intentions and
responsiveness. High ratings of attachment avoidance imply preference for independence and
discomfort with closeness, while low attachment avoidance suggests comfort with intimacy
and relational interdependence. Secure individuals are low in both attachment anxiety and
avoidance. Dismissive individuals are high in avoidance and low in anxiety, and those high
in anxiety and low in avoidance are preoccupied.1

1

A fourth attachment orientation, fearful attachment, denotes individuals high in levels of anxiety and
avoidance simultaneously. However, I will not discuss or investigate fearful attachment in this study because of
the frequently opposing emotional, cognitive, and behavioral patterns typical of high avoidance and high
anxiety (detailed above and below). The theoretical (and, indeed, practical; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991;
Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002) incoherence of fearful attachment make the prototype unpredictable in the context
of this study and a three-prototype approach has precedence (Hazan & Shaver, 1987).
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Notably, an individual’s attachment prototype is associated with romantic relationship
quality and satisfaction (Simpson, 1990; see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010, for a review).
Attachment security positively correlates with relationship satisfaction, and insecure
attachment (high anxiety and/or avoidance) is linked to relatively less relationship
satisfaction (J. Feeney, 2008). Further, secure attachment positively correlates with trust,
interdependence, and commitment. Secure individuals also experience greater intimacy and
stability in their relationships. Anxiety, however, negatively relates with trust, and
preoccupied individuals experience higher incidence of jealousy, conflict, and negative
emotions. Attachment avoidance is also associated with undesirable relationship experiences,
being negatively associated with interdependence, intimacy, and commitment. Moreover,
securely attached individuals are more adept at solving relational conflicts than their insecure
counterparts, again resulting in heightened satisfaction in the relationship. Finally,
attachment security positively correlates with the frequency of reported positive emotions
and negatively correlates with negative emotions in romantic relationships; anxiety and
avoidance correlate in the reverse fashion (Caperton & Goodvin, 2014; Simpson, Collins,
Tran, & Haydon, 2007).
Internal Working Models
To explain how and why patterns of attachment persist within individuals, Bowlby
(1969, 1973, 1980) developed the concept of the “internal working model.” Internal working
models are mental representations of attachment information. Attachment events from
infancy through adulthood inform the nature of internal working models, cumulatively
enacting an “internal simulation” of attachment information (Bowlby, 1988, as cited in
Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). This simulation creates a
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default framework for close relationships that supplants the need for creating individual
mental models for every distinct relationship.
Secure individuals hold positive internal working models typified by comfort with
both closeness and independence, and trust that they are accepted and loved (Hazan &
Shaver, 1987). Further, secure individuals hold positive dispositions toward other people,
assuming others are trustworthy, dependable, and altruistic (Collins & Read, 1990), and
believe that their attachment figures are available and helpful to them in distressing
situations.
An obsession for closeness and fear of an inaccessible partner dominate the working
models of preoccupied individuals. They harbor deep concerns that their partner does not
reciprocate the intensity of their commitment (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Preoccupied
individuals also evidence low self-worth and social self-confidence. They believe that they
have little control over their lives and find understanding others to be complex and
challenging (Collins & Read, 1990). Preoccupied individuals also make negative attributions
for ambiguous relational behaviors (Collins, 1996) and respond to true relational negativity
with anger and hostility (Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996). Preoccupied individuals,
because of their uncertainty that attachment figures will be accessible and supportive,
intensify their efforts to manage a relationship when under duress. This hyperactivation of
emotion and coping strategies (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003) often has the opposite effect that
was desired. As opposed to resolution of distress, preoccupied strategies demand more from
the attachment partner than can be expected, adding to the original source of distress.
Finally, the dismissive working models of some individuals predispose them to
eschew relational intimacy in favor of independence, fearing the loss of their personal
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agency. Dismissive individuals prefer autonomy and self-sufficiency in their relationships
and are uncomfortable with the notion of dependence (their own or their partner’s) in a
relationship (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Dismissive individuals, who typically maintain
relatively high self-worth and assertiveness, find that those competencies wilt in social
situations, especially those of an intimate nature. They generally do not consider other people
to be trustworthy or dependable (Collins & Read, 1990).
Implicit within the above descriptions are patterns of how individuals attend to
attachment information. Preoccupied individuals hyperattend to attachment information for
fear of losing their partners and dismissive individuals ignore attachment information out of
fear of losing their independence. Although these individual characteristics are considered
global relationship strategies (Fraley & Shaver, 2000) implemented as foundational
relationship schemes, it is key to understand the trigger that activates the most prototypical
attachment protocols: stress (Simpson & Rholes, 2012). The working models of stressed
insecure individuals react defensively in the interest of protecting the self. Preoccupied
individuals react to stressful relationship information by being hyperattentive and oversensitive to the source of the stress. Dismissive individuals, however, diminish the
importance of the attachment information at the source of their stress, even neglecting its
existence. Meanwhile, secure individuals not only are more capable at constructively coping
with relationship stress, attachment information in general does not threaten them. For these
reasons, secure individuals do not resort to defensive mechanisms to abate relationship
stressors (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Rholes, Simpson, & Orina, 1999). These patterns have
implications for the autobiographic memories of romantic relationships that individuals are

6
likely to hold, and for how memories that are consistent, or inconsistent, with their
attachment working model affect them.
In summary, secure individuals trust in their partners, assume their partners love and
desire them, and generally have positive mental models of relationships. Insecure individuals,
however, work from the assumption that romantic relationships are difficult and troubling.
Internal Working Models and Memory
A growing body of research demonstrates that the events and stories individuals recall
and share about their relationships reflects attachment working models. Recent research
demonstrates that memory content and themes differ by attachment style. For example,
Nosko, Tieu, Lawford, and Pratt (2011) found in a longitudinal study that the themes
described in participants’ “relationship defining” memory narratives had predictable
attachment correlates. Dismissive and preoccupied individuals were more likely to tell stories
about a relationship breaking-up than were secure individuals, who most frequently recalled
stories of “true love.” Dismissive individuals were most likely to tell stories of independence
in their past relationships. Further, highly avoidant individuals also have the most difficulty
recalling their own (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995) and others’ (Fraley & Brumbaugh, 2007)
relationship information.
The emotional content of memories is also subject to attachment differences. In
general, the emotional content of an event is retained in memory (Christianson & Engleberg,
1999) and conjured once again when the memory is activated (Collins & Allard, 2004),
measurably altering an individual’s physiological and psychological state (Philippe,
Koestner, Lecours, Beaulieu-Pelletier, & Bois, 2011; Schwartz, Weinberger, & Singer,
1981). However, attachment-related individual differences in this effect exist. For example,
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in evaluating recent emotional events, attachment anxiety and avoidance both predict lower
levels of recalled positive emotion (Gentzler & Kerns, 2006). In addition, dismissive
individuals also recall less negative emotional attachment information when compared to
others (Edelstein, 2006), and their memories of either emotional valence tend to be relatively
milder in intensity as well (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995). Anxious individuals, on the other
hand, recall memories of sadness, anger, and anxiety more quickly than people of other
attachment styles do. Further, preoccupied individuals evidence greater emotionality and
affect intensity in recalling emotional attachment events than others, even though they did
not report greater emotionality during the original event (Pietromonaco & Barrett, 1997).
Attachment security, in contrast, is associated with a more complete recall of emotional
memories (Mikulincer et al., 2001; Rowe & Carnelley, 2003). Secure individuals also recall
more positive emotions in their attachment memories, which incidentally combat negative
affective states (Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004). Indeed, secure individuals even recall more
positive events from stories when primed with a rejection-oriented cue, whereas insecure
people better recall negative events when primed with rejecting or supporting stimuli (Miller
& Noirot, 1999). That is, despite being primed for thoughts of rejection, secure individuals
still recall more positive events, while their insecure counterparts recall more negative
events, regardless of primed mindset.
In summary, secure individuals’ memories tend to be overall more positive in nature,
leading to greater psychological resiliency in stressful situations (Philippe, Lecours,
Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009). In contrast, preoccupied and dismissive individuals report more
negative emotion and negative events in their memories. Further, while preoccupied
individuals are likely to recall negative valence memories quickly and with high intensity, the
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memories of dismissive individuals are less complete and coherent in areas of attachment
information and relational emotion. These patterns are largely consistent with proposals
regarding attachment and attention to relationship salient information, described above.
Internal Working Models and Forecasts
Key to Bowlby’s conception of internal working models (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980)
is their purported predictive function. In addition to providing robust conditional guidelines
for memory protocols and interactions in the present (Simpson & Rholes, 2012), internal
working models should anticipate the nature of future interactions. In other words,
attachment theory posits that internal working models organize dispositional outlooks and
specific predictions of future relationships, dependent on the course and character of past
relationships. This facet of attachment theory predicts that experiences from past
relationships should inform cognitions concerning future relationships in a thematically
coherent manner. For example, if an individual has only known abusive romantic
relationships in the past, attachment theory would predict that the individual would expect
abuse in subsequent relationships. The same would hold true for an individual who has only
known supportive and loving relationships. The effects of experiences do not stop with
forecasts, however. Indeed, Bowlby posited that outlook would actualize in a sort of selffulfilling prophesy (Holmes, 1993). That is, he predicted that expectations about the future
would mediate links between past events and future behavior. If an individual believes that
relationships operate in a certain fashion (because of remembered past experiences), those
predictions would likely become manifest (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998).
This line of thinking is not novel to attachment theory – Piagetian schemas (Piaget, 1928),
behavioral scripts (Anderson, 1983), mental simulations in cognitive neuroscience (Adolphs,
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2006; Gallese 2005), and comparable ideas in other areas (e.g., Abelson, 1981; Bluck, 2003;
Pillemer, 2003; Ross, 1989; Schacter et al., 2012) all predict similar patterns.
Several studies have found support for this aspect of internal working models in the
context of romantic relationships. Collins (1996) found that preoccupied and dismissive
individuals have more negative explanations of hypothetical relationship events than secure
individuals do. Dismissive individuals, despite their negative explanations, did not express
emotional distress. Preoccupied individuals, however, experienced more emotional stress in
response to the hypotheticals and indicated response behaviors that would likely result in
additional conflict. This result could help explain research relating attachment anxiety
negatively to optimism about future love relationships (Carnelley & Janoff-Bulman, 1992).
Similarly, Mohr, Crook-Lyon, and Kolchakian (2010) also examined how current attachment
style related to expectations about a relationship with an imagined future romantic partner. In
response to a hypothetical situation addressing the fallout of an imagined argument with this
fictional partner, Mohr and colleagues found that high attachment avoidance predicted that
the participant expected to respond negatively, and that high attachment anxiety predicted
expecting that their partner would respond negatively. Mohr and colleagues also found that
both indices of insecurity predicted aversive communication patterns, and that avoidance
related to predictions of lower satisfaction in the future relationship. Corroborating evidence
for the effects of forecasts have been found outside of an attachment context as well,
indicating that the emotional valence (Kuwabara & Pillemer, 2010) or need satisfaction
(Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, Lecours, & Lekes, 2012) of recalled memories
impact subsequent decisions, actions, incidence of break-up, and well-being.
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These results suggest that working models do function to inform affective reactions
and cognitions about future romantic relationships. In general, the absence of attachment
anxiety and avoidance seems to result in a relatively more positive forecast. Attachment
avoidance, by comparison, relates to beliefs that future relationships will be less satisfying,
while maintaining the theme of emotional detachment. Likewise, patterns observed in
anxious working models elsewhere hold true in forecasts. Preoccupied individuals are most
likely to assume that their partner is not trustworthy, hyperactivate their emotions, and feel
that there is little cause for optimism concerning future relationships. Should the patterns
predicted above come to fruition in a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy, as attachment theory
would predict and other research suggests, forecasts could be powerful predictors of future
relationship quality and satisfaction.
The Present Study
As reviewed above, attachment internal working models likely play a role in what
memories from past relationships people experience and recall. Despite these predispositions,
it is likely that individuals have a range of relationship experiences, and thus relationship
memories. For example, although avoidant individuals are disproportionately likely to recall
break-up narratives when asked to recall a romantic relationship memory, at some point they
experienced the formation of those close relationships and their associated positive
experiences before the break up. The question of theoretical (and practical) interest,
therefore, is what effect deliberately recalling a positive or a negative romantic relationship
memory has on relationship forecasts, and whether the valence of the memory differentially
affects secure, dismissive, and preoccupied individuals. This question becomes particularly
interesting when considering how an individual might react to being asked to reminisce in a
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manner antithetical to their typical attachment processes. Secure individuals, for example, are
predisposed toward recalling positive memories – what happens when they are explicitly
asked to recall negative ones? Further, preoccupied individuals can be emotionally volatile
and particularly negative – how would they react to being asked to recall a relationship
memory they consider most positive? Moreover, for dismissive individuals, who belittle the
importance of their attachment memories in general, how might asking them to recall their
most positive or negative emotional attachment memories affect them? This study will
examine how remembering a relationship experience that is either consistent or inconsistent
with existing internal working models may affect expectations for future romantic
relationships.
The effect of recalling emotional memories on forecasts, either consistent with or
contradictory to an individual’s internal working model, could become manifest in their
forecasts in a number of ways. For example, recalling a positive memory might not cause the
forecasts of secure individuals to be substantially more positive than they already were, but
recalling a positive memory might prompt insecure, especially preoccupied, individuals to
make relatively more positive forecasts. This is because secure individuals already have
positive outlooks for their future romantic relationships, and so a corroborating memory
would do little to augment that outlook. However, a preoccupied individual, with the
combined characteristics of a more dispositional negative outlook and a tendency for
rumination on attachment information, might experience a boost in outlook if given a
positive romantic relationship memory to dwell upon. I would also expect that attachment
style would predict interesting reactions to negative memories. Secure individuals might be
relatively more resilient to effects of recalling a negative relationship experience so that it
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does not negatively influence their relationship forecasts. This resiliency could be credited to
their internal working models activating positive emotions and accessing attachment figures
(Selcuk, Zayas, Gunaydin, Hazan, & Kross, 2012) to alleviate distress and organize the
memory in the broader milieu of their attachment experiences. On the other hand,
preoccupied individuals might be expected to ruminate on the negative memory,
hyperactivating their affective state and subsequently coloring their more negative forecasts.
Dismissive individuals, meanwhile, would likely shut down their affective responses in
general, feeling less emotion overall in the interest of maintaining personal agency from the
threatening memory. Whether this memory would have any effect on their forecasts in the
absence of emotional response is an open question.
The emotional state, or, mood, generated by memory is a potential mediator in this
study. By measuring the mood of a participant following their recollection of an emotional
memory, we can determine if mood explains connections between the recalled memory and
subsequent forecast. These data become especially valuable when exploring the mediating
role of mood within a single attachment style. For example, consider a scenario where mood
and forecast scores for preoccupied individuals were memory-congruent following the recall
of both positive and negative relationship memories. In this scenario, I could conclude that
mood is a mechanism altering a preoccupied individual’s expectations for future romantic
relationships, explained by hyperactivated emotions associated with preoccupied working
models.
It is also important to take into account the possibility that memory content may differ
in meaningful ways by attachment style. Each attachment style would likely present different
patterns in their memory narratives that will affect their mood and subsequent forecasts. I
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would expect secure individuals to provide emotionally open and coherent narratives
(George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985). Because attachment information of either emotional
valence does not distress secure individuals, they would likely recall truly negative or
positive events from past relationships with neither embellishment nor restriction. Like
secure individuals, preoccupied individuals should recall highly emotional relationship
events. However, I would also expect that their predisposition toward attending to negative
thoughts would skew their recall, shunning positive details in favor of negative ones. Finally,
where I might expect preoccupied individuals to be limited in their recall of positive events,
dismissive individuals will likely eschew detail and emotionality entirely. In efforts to defuse
their stress associated with relationship events in general, dismissive narratives may attend to
the information at only a superficial level. For these reasons, this study will account for
narrative emotionality, detail, and each individual’s evaluation of their memory’s positivity
and negativity, as the content of the memories is likely to have ramifications for their
affective state as well as their relationship forecasts.
Research question. How do positive and negative romantic relationship memories of
individuals of different attachment orientations affect their mood and forecasts of future
romantic relationships? Further, what patterns of mood and relationship forecast arise when
people are asked to recall memories that either reinforce or challenge default processes of
their internal working models?
Hypotheses. A broad theoretical interpretation of how people of different attachment
orientations process emotional relationship information and their forecasts for romantic
relationships informs my specific hypotheses. I expect secure individuals will open
themselves to emotional vulnerability in the recall of their memories, but also expect
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resilience to subsequent negative emotions, resulting in uniformly positive forecasts. I predict
that dismissive individuals will not engage on an emotional level with their recalled
memories. As a result, I expect their forecasts to be unaffected by the valence of memory
they recall, and for those forecasts to be generally negative. In contrast, I expect congruence
in the valence of the memory that preoccupied individuals recall and their subsequent
forecasts.
My hypotheses below follow a pattern. The first two hypotheses address mood
responses to recalled memories, the second pair concern subsequent relationship forecasts,
and the final hypothesis addresses the potential for mood to explain the relationship between
memory recalled and forecasts. Moreover, the first and third hypotheses compare their
respective outcomes of interest within attachment groups, and the second and fourth
hypotheses compare outcomes directly between attachment groups. An explanation of the
rationale informing each hypothesis (and, by association, the broader ones above) follows
each hypothesis listing.
Hypothesis 1: Pre- to post-memory change in mood within attachment group. I
expect secure and preoccupied individuals to experience memory-congruent mood changes.
That is, I expect secure and preoccupied individuals to experience decreased state negative
emotion and increased state positive emotion after recalling a positive memory and decreased
positive emotion and increased negative emotion after recalling a negative relationship
memory. I expect dismissive individuals’ mood to remain unchanged, regardless of what
valence of memory they recall.
Justification for Hypothesis 1. Both secure and preoccupied individuals should pay
considerable attention to a relationship memory: secure people because of their positive
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associations with relationship information (and, therefore, their lack of defensive processing
heightening or suppressing their emotions)2, and preoccupied people because of their
defensive hyperattention to relationship information. Secure and preoccupied working
models should then activate memory-congruent emotions for the same reasons. Dismissive
individuals will not attend to relationship information of either valence, not allowing
processing to reach emotional depths.
Hypothesis 2: Attachment group differences in mood responses to relationship
memories. After recalling a positive relationship memory, I expect that secure individuals
will experience more positive shifts in mood than both dismissive and preoccupied
individuals will. Further, I expect preoccupied individuals to experience more positive mood
shifts than dismissive individuals after recalling a positive relationship memory. I do not
expect dismissive and preoccupied individuals to differ in negative mood changes resulting
from the positive memory condition, but expect secure individuals to experience less
negative mood change than both insecure attachment groups. After recalling a negative
relationship memory, I expect preoccupied individuals to experience more negative mood
shifts than either secure or dismissive individuals, who will not differ in negative mood
changes. I do not expect any positive mood change differences between attachment
orientations after recalling a negative relationship memory.
Justification for Hypothesis 2. Secure individuals tend toward positive relationshiprelated emotions, and preoccupied individuals tend toward negative relationship emotions.
Recalling working model-congruent memories for secure and preoccupied individuals should

2

I could argue that the positivity of secure working models will curb any negativity they might experience
before the state can truly take hold (or, for that matter, be measured). I consider this a real possibility, but
ultimately side with the expectation that secure individuals will truly engage with even negative material,
allowing themselves to feel appropriately negative emotions.
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only reinforce those emotional predispositions. Additionally, because preoccupied
individuals hypterattend to relationship information, recalling a positive relationship memory
should give them a positive emotion boost beyond what emotionally distancing dismissive
individuals may experience. However, because preoccupied individuals also carry negative
associations with relationship information, like dismissive individuals, positive relationship
memories are unlikely to ameliorate the negative emotions of either attachment style. In
response to a negative memory, secure individuals will appropriately attenuate positive
emotions, bringing them down to the same level dismissive and preoccupied individuals
occupy.
Hypothesis 3: Memory condition effects on forecasts within attachment group. For
secure and dismissive individuals, I do not expect forecasts to differ between memory
conditions, although I expect secure forecasts to be generally positive and dismissive
forecasts to be generally negative. Further, I expect preoccupied individuals’ forecasts will be
generally negative, but more negative after recalling a negative memory than after recalling a
positive memory.
Justification for Hypothesis 3. Stability and coherence marks secure attachment,
suggesting that memory valence will not be upsetting or uplifting enough to alter future
relationship forecasts. Dismissive individuals’ tendency to eschew relationship-related
information may neutralize the differential effects of recalling a positive or negative memory.
Preoccupied individuals, however, hyperattend to relationship information and the
contrasting content of recalling a positive or negative relationship memory is likely to carry
over to forecasts, given the preoccupied tendency toward rumination.
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Hypothesis 4: Attachment group differences in forecasts post-memory. I expect
securely attached individuals will have more positive forecasts than dismissive and
preoccupied individuals regardless of what sort of memory they recall. However, I expect
dismissive and preoccupied individuals’ forecasts to differ by memory condition. After
recalling a positive memory, I expect preoccupied participants to have more positive
forecasts than dismissive individuals. However, I expect preoccupied individuals to forecast
more negatively than dismissive individuals after recalling a negative memory.
Justification for Hypothesis 4. Secure individuals have positive attributions for
relationship information. These attributions are robust to challenges suggesting otherwise
because the plurality of salient positive relationship experiences automatically diminish their
threat. Preoccupied individuals’ tendency toward fixation on attachment information suggests
that making salient attachment thoughts of either valence would considerably change internal
states and forecasts. However, even when ruminating on positive relationship information,
the distressing and confusing nature of relationships do not allow for the same level of
hopefulness found in attachment security. Dismissive individuals likewise find attachment
information distressing, but the emotional valence of attachment information is less likely to
affect forecasts due to automatic and defensive distancing taking place before they can
process emotional or cognitive changes.
Hypothesis 5: Mood as a potential explanation for links between memory and
forecasts. I expect that mood will explain secure individual’s relationship with their forecasts
only after recalling a positive relationship memory. I do not expect mood to explain the
forecasts of dismissive individuals after recalling either valence of emotional memory. For
preoccupied individuals, I expect mood will partly explain their forecasts after recalling a
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positive memory and fully explain their relationship with forecasts after recalling a negative
memory.
Justification for Hypothesis 5. Secure individuals are unlikely to defensively filter the
emotional experiences resulting from recalling emotional memories. However, because their
stable working models are also unlikely to be affected by mood change, only the more
positive mood resulting from recalling a positive memory would explain the indiscriminately
positive forecasts. In contrast, dismissive individuals emotionally disentangle from
relationship information in general, making mood an unlikely explanation for their forecasts.
The moods of preoccupied individuals likely link to their forecasts because of their
hyperactivating emotional tendencies. However, because of their more negative associations,
the more negative state produced by recalling a negative relationship memory may explain
entirely forecasts in that condition.
Method
Participants
One hundred thirty-three undergraduate students (65% women, Mage = 18.26) from
introductory psychology classes at Western Washington University participated in this study
in return for in-class credit. Ninety-two percent of participants identified as predominantly or
exclusively heterosexual. This sample does not include data from 20 participants whose data
were lost due to computer software malfunctions. I also excluded 179 participants who were
in committed romantic relationships at the time of the study because the recall and
forecasting tasks of this study could be confounded by their current relationship. I also
excluded data collected from 25 single participants over 19 years of age. Cluster analyses
indicated that older participants were qualitatively different from the younger sample in
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personality measures, possibly because of their continued transition from adolescence to
emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2000).
Procedure
I recruited participants into the study using the WWU psychology department surveyhosting program. Students logged on to the website and selected my study, titled “Thoughts
on Romantic Relationships,” to participate. In the online environment, participants completed
demographic questionnaires, completed a measure of romantic attachment, and scheduled to
visit the on-campus lab. The program required at least a four-day gap between making an
appointment and visiting the lab (Mdays = 9.76, SDdays = 5.15, range = 4 – 33). Once at the
lab, research assistants randomly assigned participants to one of two experimental conditions
and led participants to a small room with a computer. Research assistants ensured
participants of their privacy and told them to take as much time as necessary to complete the
computer-based experiment.
All participants began the lab session with a measure of their mood. Following this
initial measure, participants received a prompt asking them to recall either their most vivid
positive or most vivid negative (depending on condition) emotional memory from a past
romantic relationship in which they were a part. Participants had two minutes to recall and
think on this memory before the program automatically proceeded to a screen where
participants could write about their chosen memory. The instructions encouraged detailed
narratives and participants could write for as long as they desired. However, participants
could not advance the study until ten minutes of writing time had passed.
After completing their narrative, participants rated how positive and negative they
thought the memory was and took the same measure of mood with the items in a different
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order. For the remainder of the experiment, participants imagined that they were in a future
romantic relationship. The instructions framed the imagined relationship as being highly
committed and set five years into the future and one year into the relationship, as
implemented by Mohr, Crook-Lyon, and Kolchakian (2010). While imagining they are in a
future relationship, participants provided their expectations for the qualities of that
relationship; that is, their forecasts of what that relationship would be like.
Measures
Romantic attachment. Before coming to the lab, participants completed the
Experiences in Close Relationships Questionnaire – Revised (ECR-R, Fraley, Waller, &
Brennan, 2000), a self-report measure of adult romantic attachment. The ECR-R has 36items, half of which measure attachment avoidance (α = .94) and half address attachment
anxiety (α = .93). Attachment avoidance reflects participants’ discomfort with closeness and
attachment anxiety reflects participants’ fear of abandonment. An example of an avoidance
item is “I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close.” An example of
an item measuring anxiety is “I find that my partner(s) don’t want to get as close as I would
like.” All items are rated on a 7-point scale where 1 = strongly agree and 7 = strongly
disagree.
Mood. Forty-five items from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) measured the
mood of participants before and after their recall of an emotional romantic relationship
memory. An item’s relevance to relationship experiences determined its inclusion, such as
“joyful” and “ashamed”. Participants rated the extent to which they felt the indicated emotion
at that moment on a 5-point scale, where 1 = very slightly or not at all and 5 = extremely.
Factor analysis (see “Preliminary Analyses”) resulted in a positive mood scale and a negative
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mood scale, both of which were reliable in both conditions, before and after participants
recalled an emotional memory (.88 < α < .96).
Forecasted functioning of future relationship. Participants completed a series of
measures following the recall of their emotional memory that addressed their forecasts of
future romantic relationships, as implemented by Collins (1996) and Mohr, Crook-Lyon, &
Kolchakian (2010). Multiple measures addressed different aspects of attachment working
models and relationship quality.
Forecasted relationship satisfaction and dissolution. A two-item (e.g., “I would be
satisfied with my relationship with my partner.”) relationship satisfaction scale (α = .76) was
embedded within the following “forecasted communication” inventory. This version of the
scale was adapted by Mohr, Crook-Lyon, and Kolchakian (2010) and created by Collins and
Read (1990). Participants also indicated how likely they thought it was that their imagined
future relationship would experience infidelity perpetrated by either the participant or the
imagined partner and if they thought the relationship would ultimately end in a break-up.
Forecasted communication. Participants completed three subscales of the Marital
Communication Inventory (Bienvenu, 1970). These subscales (Schumm et al., 1983) measure
the amount of convivial and pleasant discussion participants forecasted to have with their
imagined future partner (five items; α = .76), the degree to which communication with their
imagined future partner would be avoided by both parties (5 items; α = .76), and the level of
aversive communication participants would experience in the relationship (4 items; α = .76).
Each item is rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly disagree).
Forecasted romantic attachment. A modified version of the Experiences in Close
Relationships Questionnaire (ECR; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) measured participants’
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forecasted attachment to their imagined future partner. The ECR has 36 items evenly divided
between items addressing attachment anxiety (α = .92) and avoidance (α = .92). Items are
rated on a 5-point Likert scale, 1 = Strongly Disagree, to 5 = Strongly Agree. Mohr, CrookLyon, and Kolchakian (2010) reworded this version’s items into the future tense. An example
of an item measuring future anxiety is “I would worry a lot about my relationships,” and an
example item measuring future avoidance is “I would prefer not to show a partner how I feel
deep down.”
Hypothetical relationship scenarios. As in Mohr, Crook-Lyon, and Kolchakian
(2010), participants imagined that “you and your partner have just had an argument about the
amount of time that you spend together. How likely is it that your partner would be thinking
the following thoughts?” This prompt preceded four items beginning with the words “Your
partner thinks,” followed by “I will never have my needs met in this relationship,” “This
relationship is not going to last for much longer,” “I feel trapped in this relationship,” and “I
want to end this relationship.” These items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all
likely, 4 = somewhat likely, 7 = very likely). Next, participants were asked to rate on the same
7-point Likert scale “how likely it is that you would have the following thoughts” with the
same four items from above, only this time beginning with “You think.” Averages from both
subscales’ items formed a measure of how negative participant forecasts are of their partner’s
and their own thoughts about the hypothetical argument.
Further, participants read four relationship-relevant hypothetical situations and
provided quantitative responses (Collins, 1996). An example situation is “Your partner didn’t
comfort you when you were feeling down.” Following each event description, participants
indicated how likely they thought each scenario was to result in a conflict. Participants also
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rated each of the four prompts on seven different emotions (e.g. “angry,” “sad,” “hurt”) on a
7-point Likert scale, imagining how the event would make them feel. These responses were
aggregated to form a measure of how distressing (Collins, 1996) each event would be (.87 <
α < .94).
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Attachment security. I used the ECR-R (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000) to assess
participants’ romantic relationship attachment. The ECR-R is typically implemented as a
continuous measure of attachment, where each participant is scored on dimensions of
attachment anxiety and avoidance (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000). However, using
attachment dimensions as predictors requires univariate normality and a linear bivariate
relation to be interpretable. I tested the univariate normality of attachment anxiety and
avoidance with a Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) and found that, although anxiety
did not violate assumptions of normality (W(133) = .985, p = .142), attachment avoidance did
(W(133) = .957, p < .001). To test bivariate linearity, I used a curve estimation of the relation
between anxiety and avoidance. Of the curves estimating the relation, the linear model
explained the least variability between scores of anxiety and avoidance with only 3.4% of
observed variance explained. If I used attachment avoidance as a predictor variable or used
the two dimensions as an interaction term, their non-normality and non-linearity could result
in erroneous results (Howell, 2010).
Rather than use data transformations that would change the behavior of the bivariate
relation (Osborne, 2002), I investigated a satisfactory categorical solution in lieu of a
continuous option. Numerous studies in the adult attachment literature use categorical
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attachment predictors and outcomes, often labelled as attachment styles, orientations, or
prototypes (e.g., Carnelley & Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Collins, 1996; Hazan & Shaver, 1987;
Simpson, 1990). Further, a categorical treatment of attachment data is appropriate for
investigating hypotheses here.
I elected to use cluster analysis to demarcate attachment categories for these data. I
chose cluster analysis because it identifies groups as they naturally occur in the dataset,
assigning each case to a cluster based on its similarity to those surrounding it. I consider this
approach psychometrically meaningful and therefore superior to artificially splitting the data
with median splits or defining categories based on others’ published averages. I used twostep cluster analysis with Schwarz’s Bayesian clustering criterion and entered attachment
anxiety and avoidance simultaneously. Cluster analysis results revealed three clusters with
good average silhouette cohesion and separation (.5). Anxiety and avoidance were also
relatively close in their input importance (anxiety = 1.0; avoidance = .84); that is, no one
dimension was primarily defining the cluster profiles. Further, the identified clusters were
theoretically coherent and readily identifiable as secure, preoccupied, and dismissive
attachment orientations (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). As shown in Table 1 and
illustrated Figure 1, the secure cluster had the lowest mean scores of anxiety and avoidance
in the sample. Further, the highest mean avoidance defined the dismissive cluster. The same
pattern held true for the preoccupied cluster and mean anxiety scores. Bartholomew’s
attachment prototypes include a fourth group, fearful-avoidant, which is not represented in
the cluster profiles. High levels of anxiety in combination with high levels of avoidance
define fearful-avoidant attachment. An examination of the scatterplot mapping attachment
cluster profiles on anxiety and avoidance dimensions indicates that the preoccupied and
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dismissive clusters evenly split the quadrant defined by high avoidance and high anxiety.
Given that I have no hypotheses for fearful-avoidance, splitting the quadrant is appropriate.
Mood factor analysis and scales. I used exploratory factor analysis to determine
which PANAS-X items (Watson & Clark, 1994) were best suited to measure positive and
negative mood for this sample. To do so, I subjected post-manipulation survey scores to
principal components analysis and used a promax rotation to allow for correlated factors. I
removed one item (“jittery”) that indicated only mediocre sampling adequacy (item KMO =
.664). The resulting overall KMO measure of sampling adequacy was a meritorious .88, and
all item measures of sampling adequacy were greater than .76. Nine factors emerged with
eigenvalues greater than one, but an examination of the scree plot supported a two-factor
solution. Additionally, the two highest-eigenvalue factors explained 48% of observed
variance with the other seven factors only contributing a cumulative 23% of explained
variance. I then limited the pattern matrix to load all items on two factors. One factor
contained positive emotion items and the other contained negative emotion items. To
differentiate the factors, I selected items into the final scales that had a factor coefficient of at
least .7 with the expected factor and a coefficient no greater than .3 on the other factor.
Factor loadings and item assignments are in Table 2. The resulting scales were negatively
correlated (r = -.378, p < .01) and reliable pre- and post-manipulation in both conditions (.88
< α < .96).
Forecast factor analysis and scales. I used exploratory factor analysis to aggregate
and simplify the outcomes of the relationship forecast questionnaires. I analyzed the scored
scales and standalone items using principal components analysis with a promax rotation. The
resulting overall KMO was a meritorious .86, with every item measure of sampling adequacy
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greater than .73. Although four factors emerged with eigenvalues above one, the scree plot
and ratio of explained variance suggested a two-factor solution. The two highest-eigenvalue
factors explained a combined 47% of observed variance after limiting the analysis to a twofactor solution. As seen in Table 3, each scale or item except conflict resulting from partner
wanting a night to themselves and participant infidelity had a factor coefficient of at least .58
on the expected factor, with no factor coefficients greater than .22 on the other factor. The
interpretation of the structure coefficients was consistent with the pattern coefficients. To
improve factor differentiation, I did not assign the cross-loading item conflict resulting from
partner wanting a night to himself/herself or the weak-loading item participant infidelity to
either factor.
I designated one factor as the Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor (RDF) and the other
as Partner Rejection Angst Factor (PRAF) after examining the respective scales and items
assigned to each factor. I indicate scale assignment in Table 3. General negative outcomes
and experiences define the imagined future relationship scales contained in the RDF,
indicative of imagined relationship dissatisfaction. In contrast, the new PRAF scale contains
items and scales defined by negative reactions to slights perpetrated by the participants’
imagined future partners. I analyzed the reliability of the RDF and PRAF scales using every
item that contributed to the scales from which they were constructed. I found both scales to
be highly reliable in both the positive memory recall condition (RDF α = .87; PRAF α = .96)
and the negative memory recall condition (RDF α = .87; PRAF α = .95).
I computed the RDF and PRAF variables used in analyses by standardizing scales and
standalone items, reverse-coding scales that loaded negatively onto their assigned factor, and
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averaging the results. All subsequent analyses of forecast variable implement the RDF and
PRAF variables in this standardized form.
Partner Rejection Angst Factor hypotheses ramifications. The Partner Rejection
Angst Factor (PRAF) introduces an interesting but unexpected outcome variable to this
study. Whereas the broadness of the Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor (RDF) allows it to fit
cleanly into my hypotheses, the PRAF is notably different. PRAF, unlike RDF, obviously
maps onto a specific dimension of attachment, in the case of PRAF, anxiety. Given that
anxiety levels in part define my primary predictor variables, attachment groups, I would
expect slightly different attachment-related outcomes from forecasts of partner rejection
angst than I would for forecasts of relationship dissatisfaction. Although I have the same
predictions for Hypothesis 5 for PRAF as I would RDF (i.e., I think mood should similarly
mediate PRAF ratings as they would RDF ratings.), I would expect slightly different
attachment-related predictions for Hypotheses 3 and 4.
Whereas I think secure individuals, relative to the overall group and both of their
insecure counterparts, will forecast lower RDF levels (“more positive” forecasts), I do not
expect PRAF levels to differentiate between secure and dismissive individuals. Both secure
and dismissive individuals rate relatively low in attachment anxiety. As such, they should not
be concerned with their partner’s rejection of them in the imagined future romantic
relationship (i.e., more positive PRAF forecasts for secure and dismissive groups). I also
expect preoccupied individuals to forecast higher PRAF scores than secure and dismissive
individuals in both conditions. Preoccupied attachment hinges on the sensitivities tapped by
the PRAF, and I expect that recalling a positive relationship memory will not be enough to
ameliorate such a defining characteristic of preoccupied working models to the point where
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their PRAF forecasts would not differ from those of secure or dismissive individuals’. In
summary, I expect preoccupied individuals’ PRAF ratings to be higher than others’ in the
positive memory condition and taken to maximum levels as the result of recalling a working
model-arousing negative relationship memory.
Narrative homogeneity between attachment clusters and manipulation checks. I
wanted to see if participants’ written narratives of a positive or negative romantic
relationship memory differed by attachment cluster and memory condition in order to
contextualize the primary analyses of this study. I was specifically interested to see if
narratives differed by attachment and condition in length (i.e., word count), use of positive
emotion words, use of negative emotion words, and participants’ own ratings of how positive
and negative they thought their memory was. Differences in these variables between
attachment clusters would contextualize relations between this study’s manipulation, state
emotion, and forecasts and would be important to consider in interpreting any findings.
Differences in these variables between memory conditions would function as a manipulation
check.
Research assistants cleaned the narratives by correcting misspelled and misused (e.g.,
“there” rather than “their”) words before I entered the narratives into the Linguistic Inquiry
and Word Count computer program (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2001). The
LIWC program analyzed each narrative for the overall word count and the number of
positive and negative emotion words according to a built-in dictionary. Positive emotion
words included “happy,” “love,” and “pretty,” while negative emotion words included
“hate,” “afraid,” and “pissed.”
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Analytic approach. I took a hierarchical regression approach to analyze these data. I
performed a series of data transformations and analyses to predict word count, positive
emotion words, negative emotion words, and participant ratings of memory positivity and
negativity with each attachment cluster, memory condition, and the two-way interactions
between the attachment cluster and memory condition. The following describes my treatment
of the data and my analytical approach. I coded attachment clusters using effect codes. Effect
coding conveys group membership using ones, zeroes, and minus ones. Focal groups receive
either a one or zero in k – 1 vectors, while one group acts as a reference group and receives a
minus one in each vector. Whereas dummy coding (ones for focal group, zeroes for reference
group/s) compares a group’s mean to the mean of the reference groups (a simple effects
parameterization), effect coding estimates the true main effects of categorical variables by
testing the deviation of a focal group’s mean from the grand mean (Stevens, 2007; Wendorf,
2004). When used in a regression analysis, the grand mean of the dependent variable
becomes the intercept and the slope of the predictor is the difference between the dependent
variable’s grand mean and the mean of the predictor (Penn State Methodology Center, 2012).
Because the number of participants in each attachment cluster was not equal, I weighted my
effect codes so that the focal group remained coded as 1, but the reference group was coded
as the negative inverse of the ratio between the number of cases in the focal group to the
number of cases in the reference group (e.g. 50 focal group secure participants / 40 reference
group dismissive participants = 1.25 * -1 = -1.25; Newsom, 2012; UCLA Statistical
Consulting Group, 2014). I coded two sets of vectors in order to analyze all three attachment
clusters by changing the reference group from the first vector to a focal group in the second
vector. As a result, I report the subsequent regression results from two regression equations.
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However, because both equations contain the same attachment information – only different
reference groups – the overall R2 and F statistics were the same in both. Moreover, the
attachment group that remained a focal group in both analyses (secure) returned identical
regression coefficients and t-test results in both regression equations.
Memory condition was coded so that 0 = positive memory condition and 1 = negative
memory condition. I then centered the memory condition variable to keep the grand mean of
the dependent variable near the intercept and to prevent potential problems arising from
predictor multicollinearity. To create interaction terms, I multiplied each attachment cluster
vector by memory condition to create three two-way interaction terms.
I used hierarchical multiple regression for these analyses. In Step 1, I entered paired
attachment vectors and the memory condition variable simultaneously. In Step 2, I added the
interaction terms of each attachment vector with memory condition. Regression coefficients
and bivariate correlations predicting linguistic content variables are in Table 4. Regression
coefficients and bivariate correlations predicting participant ratings of their memory’s
positivity and negativity are in Table 5. Means and standard deviations for all narrative
variables are in Table 6.
Word count. The overall regression equation predicting word count was not
statistically significant at Step 1 or Step 2 of the regression equation, with predictors
explaining only 3% of the observed variance in word count. In other words, the length of
memory narratives did not differ by attachment group membership, memory condition, or by
attachment group membership between memory conditions.
Positive emotion words. The overall regression equation predicting positive emotion
words was statistically significant at Step 1, with predictors explaining 27% of the variance,
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F(3, 128) = 15.48, p < .001. The addition of Step 2 (ΔF (2, 126) = .532, p = .589), however,
did not explain statistically more variance (ΔR2 = .006). Attachment group membership was
not a predictor of positive emotion words in the context of the other predictors. However,
memory condition was a negative predictor of positive word usage in the context of the other
predictors (t(128) = -7.47, p < .001). These results indicate that, although use of positive
emotion words did not differ by attachment group membership, participants in the positive
memory condition used more positive emotion words in their narratives than did participants
in the negative memory condition.
Negative emotion words. The overall regression equation predicting negative emotion
words was statistically significant at Step 1, with predictors explaining 31% of the variance,
F(3, 128) = 18.82, p < .001. The addition of Step 2 (ΔF (2, 126) = .450, p = .639) did not
explain statistically more variance (ΔR2 = .005). Attachment group membership was not a
predictor of negative emotion word usage in the context of the other predictors, but memory
condition was a positive predictor in the context of the other predictors (t(128) = 7.47, p <
.001). Like with positive emotion words, usage of negative emotion words did not differ by
attachment group membership. However, participants in the negative memory condition did
use more negative emotion words than participants in the positive memory condition did.
Participants’ ratings of memory positivity and negativity. Both regression equations
predicting participant ratings of how positive (F(3, 129) = 145.80, p < .001) and negative
(F(3, 129) = 94.32, p < .001) they considered their recalled memory to be explained
statistically significant amounts of variance in Step 1 (memory positivity: ΔR2 = .001;
memory negativity: ΔR2 = .004), but not in Step 23 (memory positivity: R2 = .772; memory
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A note on interactions in the above regression analyses: It might be interpreted that non-significant attachment
group-by-condition interactions indicate that a given attachment groups’ usage of, for example, positive
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negativity: R2 = .687). Memory condition was the only statistically significant predictor in
both equations, indicating a negative relationship with ratings of memory positivity (t(129) =
-20.89, p < .001) and a positive relationship with ratings of negativity (t(129) = 16.63, p <
.001). Attachment membership was not a predictor. In other words, participant attachment
membership did not affect their ratings of how positive or negative their memory was.
However, participants in the positive memory condition rated their memory as being more
positive than did individuals in the negative memory condition. In turn, participants in the
negative memory condition rated their memory as being more negative than did individuals
in the positive memory condition
Within-condition mood changes. Finally, I investigated participants’ scores of
positive and negative state emotion to determine the effectiveness of the memory conditions
at altering mood. Using repeated-measures ANOVA, I examined the changes in state
emotions indicating positive and negative mood from before the recall manipulation to after.
Please see Table 7 for descriptive statistics, tests of significance, and effect sizes found in the
positive memory condition. For the same statistics for the negative memory condition, see
Table 8. In the positive memory condition, I found a decrease in positive mood and no
change for negative mood from pre-manipulation to post-manipulation. In the negative
memory condition, I found a decrease in positive mood and an increase in negative mood
pre- to post-manipulation. I also used a one-way ANOVA to compare post-manipulation
positive and negative mood directly between conditions. The differences in scores of positive

emotion words did not differ by memory condition. This interpretation would be incorrect. Because I used
effect coding for attachment variables that centers the intercept about the grand mean of the dependent variable,
a non-significant interaction instead indicates that the usage of positive emotion words for a given attachment
group was no different from the whole sample’s usage of positive words between conditions. Therefore, the
statistically significant main effects of memory condition capture each attachment group’s usage of positive
emotion words.
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mood did not reach between conditions (F(1, 131) = 3.18, p = .249). However, scores of
negative mood did (F(1, 131) = 4.81, p = .030), such that participants reported higher levels
of negative mood following recall of a negative memory than they did after recalling a
positive memory.
Summary and discussion of condition effectiveness. Taken together, these
manipulation checks indicate that participants adhered to condition-specific instructions in
their narrative writing and considered the positivity and negativity of the event they recalled
to be congruent with the condition’s goal. However, this pattern did not directly translate into
condition congruent changes in mood pre- to post-manipulation or post-manipulation
differences in positive and negative mood. Participants in the negative memory condition
collectively experienced decreased positive mood and increased negative mood, as intended
in the study design. However, participants in the positive memory condition also experienced
decreased positive mood and no change in negative mood. Further, scores of positive mood
did not differ between conditions, where negative mood scores did differ between conditions.
The intent of each condition was to elicit congruent changes in positive and negative
mood (e.g., increased positive mood and decreased negative mood in the positive memory
condition). The negative memory condition exhibited this pattern in all analyses, but the
positive memory condition did not. The greater salience of and weight given to negative life
events when compared to positive life events (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Taylor, 1991) may
explain these results. If negative events and the emotions they bear are more deeply
processed as a function of self-definition (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs,
2001), it would follow that recalling these negative autobiographical events result in more
tangible mood outcomes. However, this theory does not reconcile why positive mood
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decreased after recalling a positive memory. I suggest two reasons for this effect. First, I
suspect the decrease in positive mood is associated with general emotion attenuation
resulting from recall task cognitive load (Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2001). In
concentrating on recalling and writing their narratives, participants’ focus may have
depressed emotionality in general. In combination with the decentralized importance of
positive memories addressed above, cognitive load may have devitalized the emotional
experience of recalling a positive romantic relationship memory. Alternatively, perhaps
simultaneously, decreased positive mood after recalling a positive relationship memory may
be the result of participants becoming wistful. My participants were not in committed
romantic relationships at the time of the experiment. Therefore, recalling a positive,
autobiographical relationship memory could elicit feelings of yearning and nostalgia
(Gebauer & Sedikides, 2010) for an event or relationship that is no longer a part of their lives
(Bluck & Alea, 2002). This nostalgia could consequently undermine the positivity of the
memory and associated positive mood.
Primary Analyses
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 posited how levels of positive and negative mood would
change from before recalling an emotional relationship memory to after for people of
different attachment groups. To investigate, I used repeated-measures ANOVAs to examine
how state positive and negative mood changed from pre- to post-manipulation with each of
the three attachment clusters in each memory condition. The results of these analyses are in
Table 7 for the positive memory condition and Table 8 for the negative memory condition.
Secure participants in the positive memory condition experienced no changes in positive or
negative mood, contrary to expectations, but they did experience expected decreases in
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positive mood and increases in negative mood in the negative memory condition. Both
dismissive and preoccupied participants, in contrast, reported decreases in positive mood in
the positive memory condition. This result aligns with hypotheses for preoccupied
individuals, but I expected dismissive individuals to report no changes in mood. In the
negative memory condition, preoccupied participants, like the secure participants, reported
decreases in positive mood and increases in negative mood pre- to post-manipulation, as
expected. Dismissive participants reported decreased positive mood in the negative memory
condition, contrary to predictions, but aligned with hypotheses for negative mood, with no
change in negative mood in either memory condition.
Hypothesis 2. My second hypothesis suggested attachment group differences in how
recalling positive and negative relationship memories would affect mood.4 I created mood
balance scores by subtracting each participant’s ratings of negative mood indicators from
their ratings of positive mood to create a single variable that would holistically assess
participant mood. To investigate, I saved the unstandardized residuals from a regression
analysis predicting post-manipulation mood scores with pre-manipulation mood scores. I
then used one-way ANOVAs5 to compare mood residuals between attachment groups, in
effect comparing the shift in mood from pre- to post-manipulation between attachment
groups. I found that, in both the positive (F(2, 60) = 2.87, p = .065, η2 = .09) and negative
memory conditions (F(2, 67) = 1.79, p = .175, η2 = .05), overall mood did not differ by
attachment group membership. To explore whether positive and negative mood specifically
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I also compared pre-manipulation scores of positive and negative mood between attachment clusters in each
condition. One-way ANOVAs and Tukey’s HSD follow-ups revealed only one statistically significant
difference: secure participants reported more positive mood than dismissive participants in the negative memory
condition (F(2, 67) = 4.32, p = .017). I consider this result in the Hypothesis 2 section within the Discussion.
5
I used a Bonferroni correction to account for increased the increased probability of Type I error resulting from
multiple tests, adjusting the level of significance from p = .05 to p = .013. This adjustment did not change the
interpretation of any results, however.
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would differ between memory conditions, I performed the same analysis using residuals from
positive and negative mood ratings. I found that, in the positive memory condition, ratings of
positive (F(2, 60) = 2.20, p = .119, η2 = .07) and negative (F(2, 60) = 2.43, p = .096, η2 = .08)
mood change did not differ by attachment cluster. Additionally, I did not find attachment
group differences for positive (F(2, 67) = .56, p = .573, η2 = .02) or negative (F(2, 60) = 2.85,
p = .065, η2 = .08) mood changes in the negative memory condition. In other words, the
memory conditions’ effects on mood did not differ by attachment group membership.
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 concerns the predictive function of attachment, memory
condition, and the two working together in concert to predict scores of Relationship
Dissatisfaction Factor (RDF) and Partner Rejection Factor (PRAF). To address the
hypothesis, I took the same multiple hierarchical regression approach as I did when analyzing
narrative variables. Additionally, I used PROCESS (Model 1; Hayes, 2013) to probe
statistically significant interactions. PROCESS is a computation macro for SPSS that
performs multivariate analyses and automatic probing. For interactions, the macro provides
conditional effects that indicate the nature of the predictor’s relation to the outcome variable
at different levels of the moderator. I entered dummy-coded attachment variables so that 1 =
focal attachment group and 0 = other attachment groups to allow for simple effects
parameterization (Hayes, 2013) and greater ease of interpretation.
Predicting Relationship Dissatisfaction with attachment and memory condition.
Regression coefficients and bivariate correlations predicting Relationship Dissatisfaction
Factor scores (RDF) are in Table 9. The overall regression equation predicting RDF was
statistically significant at Step 1, with predictors explaining 24% of the variance, F(3, 127) =
13.48, p < .001. The addition of Step 2 (ΔF (2, 124) = 5.92, p = .004) explained statistically
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more variance (ΔR2 = .066). However, memory condition was not a contributor in Step 1
(t(126) = -1.01, p = .314). These results indicate that, considered together, attachment group
membership and their respective interaction terms with memory condition were predictors of
RDF, despite the valence of the memory participants recalled not affecting RDF scores alone.
Below, I report the effects of attachment membership and their interactions with memory
condition in predicting RDF.
Secure cluster. At Step 1, being in the secure cluster was a negative predictor of RDF
in the context of the other predictors (t(126) = -5.99, p < .001). However, in Step 2, the
interaction term of secure-by-condition was not a predictor of RDF in the context of the other
predictors (t(124) = .163, p = .871). These results suggest that securely attached individuals
forecasted less6 relationship dissatisfaction than what was typical for the full sample.
Moreover, because the interaction with memory condition was not significant, these forecasts
were not different based on whether a secure person recalled a positive relationship memory
or a negative one. These results support my hypothesis for secure individuals.
Dismissive cluster. The Step 1 entry of the dismissive cluster also predicted RDF in
the context of the other predictors (t(126) = 4.72, p < .001). The association between
dismissive attachment and RDF is positive, indicating that dismissive participants forecast
more relationship dissatisfaction overall. The inclusion of the Step 2 interaction of
dismissive-by-condition was also statistically significant (t(124) = -3.03, p = .003), contrary
to expectations. The interaction between memory condition and the dismissive cluster
indicates that the relation between dismissive attachment and RDF differed depending on the
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Higher scores on the forecast variables indicate predictions of more of that negative variable. In the
terminology used in my hypotheses, higher scores in these variables would be akin to my use of the term
“negative” because higher scores indicate less desirable outcomes. Conversely, a more positive outcome would
be associated with lower scores in the forecast variables.
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participants’ memory condition assignment. To investigate, I analyzed this two-way
interaction using PROCESS (Model 1; Hayes, 2013) as described above. I found that
dismissive attachment had a positive conditional effect on RDF in the positive memory
condition (t(128) = 5.24, p < .001), but not the negative memory condition (t(128) = .178, p =
.217). Therefore, dismissive participants forecasted more relationship dissatisfaction
following the recall of a positive memory than is typical, but did not differ from the average
in relationship dissatisfaction forecasts after recalling a negative memory.
Preoccupied cluster. Finally, I predicted RDF using preoccupied cluster membership
and found that the Step 1 entry of preoccupied attachment was, unexpectedly, not a predictor
of RDF in the context of the other predictors, t(126) = 1.60, p = .111. Overall, preoccupied
people did not differ from the group in their relationship dissatisfaction forecasts. However,
the Step 2 preoccupied-by-condition variable was statistically significant (t(124) = 2.81, p =
.006). In exploring this interaction, conditional effects revealed that preoccupied individuals
did not differ from the average RDF forecasts in the positive memory condition (t(128) = .865, p = .389), but preoccupied attachment did predict higher levels of RDF in the negative
memory condition than was typical (t(128) = 2.7, p = .007). In other words, after recalling a
positive relationship memory, preoccupied people did not forecast more or less relationship
dissatisfaction than average. However, recalling a negative romantic relationship memory did
cause preoccupied individuals to forecast more relationship dissatisfaction than was typical
for the whole sample, as expected.
Predicting Partner Rejection Angst with attachment and memory condition. I
investigated the attachment clusters and their interactions with the memory conditions
relations with the Partner Rejection Angst Factor (PRAF) in the same manner as I did with
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RDF. Regression coefficients and bivariate correlations predicting PRAF are in Table 9. The
overall regression equation predicting PRAF was statistically significant at Step 1, with
predictors explaining 19% of the variance in PRAF, F(3, 129) = 10.30, p < .001. The
addition of Step 2, however, (ΔF (2, 127) = .428, p = .652) did not explain statistically more
variance (ΔR2 = .005). Moreover, memory condition was not a predictor of PRAF in Step 1
(t(129) = .368, p = .713). These results indicate that attachment membership alone explained
notable variation in forecasts of partner rejection angst. Recalling a positive or negative
relationship memory, however, had no effects on participants’ PRAF ratings for a particular
attachment group or the collective group. Because there were no statistically significant
results in Step 2 of the models, I only report the Step 1 effects of attachment membership
predicting PRAF. As such, the reported effects hold true whether participants recalled a
positive memory or a negative memory. I expected the lack of an interaction with memory
condition for secure and dismissive individuals, but not for preoccupied individuals.
Secure cluster. Attachment security at Step 1 of the model was a negative predictor of
PRAF in the context of the other predictors (t(129) = -3.75, p < .001), as expected. That is,
secure people forecasted less partner rejection angst than was typical for the overall sample.
Dismissive cluster. Unexpectedly, membership in the dismissive cluster did not
predict PRAF levels in the context of the other predictors of Step 1 (t(129) = -1.59, p = .113).
In other words, dismissive people did not differ from the norm of the sample in their
forecasts of partner rejection angst.
Preoccupied cluster. The preoccupied attachment cluster predicted a positive relation
with PRAF (t(129) = 5.44, p < .001). This result indicates that preoccupied participants
forecasted, as expected, more partner rejection angst than was typical for the sample.
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Hypothesis 4. My fourth hypothesis concerned how the forecasts of different
attachment groups would compare with one another.
Differences in Relationship Dissatisfaction by attachment. To explore the RDF
forecasts difference between attachment groups within a given memory condition, I used
analyses of variance.7 Table 10 shows the analyzed means and standard deviations. The
omnibus test returned as statistically significant in the positive memory condition (F(2, 58) =
15.13, p < .001, η2 = .34), so I analyzed the differences between the attachment clusters using
Tukey’s HSD. I found that secure and preoccupied participants did not differ in their ratings
of RFD (p = .245), counter to my expectations. However, dismissive participants reported
higher scores of RFD than both secure (p < .001) and preoccupied participants (p = .002), as
expected. That is, after recalling a positive relationship memory, dismissive individuals
forecasted more relationship dissatisfaction than did secure and preoccupied participants.
The negative memory condition also exhibited differences in RDF scores by
attachment cluster (F(2, 66) = 11.32, p < .001, η2 = .26). Specifically, secure participants
reported lower RDF scores than dismissive (p = .003) and preoccupied (p < .001)
participants, as expected. In turn, dismissive participants’ scores of RDF were did not differ
from those of preoccupied participants (p = .618), contrary to my predictions. In other words,
preoccupied individuals forecasted more RDF than dismissive and secure individuals after
recalling a negative relationship memory, and secure RDF forecasts were lower still than
dismissive participants’ forecasts.
I also wanted to conduct a more holistic, post-hoc examination of how different
attachment groups made forecast predictions. To investigate, I compared the slopes of each

7

A Bonferroni correction moved the level of significance from p = .05 to p = .013. This adjustment again did
not change the interpretation of any results.
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attachment group’s RDF forecasts between conditions, allowing me to contrast how memory
condition affected each attachment groups’ forecasted RDF. To isolate the slope of RDF for
each attachment group, I used PROCESS to find the conditional effect of memory condition
when a dummy-coded attachment variable was equal to one. I then compared the coefficients
and standard errors of these lines in a slopes difference test (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,
2003; Soper, 2014), using the n’s for the respective number of participants assigned to the
pertinent attachment cluster.
An illustration of these results is in Figure 2. I found that the secure participants’
slopes predicting RDF across memory conditions did not differ from those of dismissive
(t(86) = 1.85, p = .067) or preoccupied (t(86) = 1.45, p = .151) participants. However, the
slope of dismissive participants did differ from slopes of preoccupied participants (t(79) =
3.09, p = .002) when predicting RDF across conditions. These results indicate that the
relation of memory condition to relationship dissatisfaction forecasts for secure participants
did not differ from either dismissive or preoccupied participants’ slopes. The effect of the
memory conditions, however, did cause dismissive and preoccupied participants’ forecasts of
relationship dissatisfaction to differ. Notably, the slope for dismissive individuals was
negative where the slope for preoccupied individuals was positive, indicating that the
memory conditions had inverse effects on preoccupied and dismissive participants.
Differences in Partner Rejection Angst by attachment. I used ANOVA to investigate
if there were differences between attachment clusters’ PRAF levels in the same memory
condition. Please find the means and standard deviations for these analyses in Table 10. The
omnibus test indicated that there were significant differences between the attachment clusters
in the positive memory condition (F(2, 60) = 8.82, p < .001, η2 = .23). Investigation with
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Tukey’s HSD revealed that preoccupied participants forecasted more PRAF than secure (p =
.001) and dismissive participants (p = .003). Secure and dismissive participants did not differ
in their PRAF forecasts (p = .930). In other words, although secure and dismissive
individuals forecasted similar partner rejection angst, preoccupied individuals forecasted
more partner rejection angst than both after recalling a positive memory, all of which
supports my predictions.
In the negative memory condition, PRAF scores also differed by attachment (F(2, 67)
= 6.66, p = .002, η2 = .17). As was the relation in the positive memory condition, secure and
dismissive participant did not differ in the forecasts of PRAF (p = .561). However,
preoccupied participants only forecasted more PRAF than secure participants (p = .002).
Preoccupied and dismissive individuals did not differentiate in PRAF scores (p = .057),
although I expected they would.
As performed with the RDF, I used the conditional effect of memory condition when
attachment cluster variables were equal to one to elucidate the effect of each attachment style
across conditions in predicting PRAF. Figure 3 illustrates these results. My analyses revealed
no differences between the slopes of participants from secure, dismissive, and preoccupied
clusters predicting PRAF across conditions. That is, secure, dismissive, and preoccupied
people forecasted partner rejection angst in the same manner across conditions.
Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 predicted that changes in mood could explain the link
between an attachment group’s memory and their forecasts. To test this, I again implemented
the balance score residuals used during manipulation checks. Balance scores are appropriate
for determining the mediating role of mood because they are a holistic representation of a
participants’ mood. An examination of the mediating role of only negative mood or only
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positive mood would be low in ecological validity because the two do not exist discretely. To
test preliminary conditions for mediation, I isolated individuals from each attachment cluster
and computed the zero-order correlations for memory condition, mood balance residuals, and
forecast variables. In each analysis, the correlation between the memory condition and mood
balance score was non-significant. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), this result fails a
necessary condition for partial and complete mediation, indicating that mood does not
mediate the relation between memory condition and forecast variables for any of the three
attachment groups.
Discussion
I designed the present study to explore the effects of people’s past relationship
memories on their forecasts of future romantic relationships. To investigate, I asked
participants not currently in a romantic relationship to recall either their most vivid positive
or negative relationship event. I measured the mood changes participants experienced after
recalling a relationship memory and asked them to forecast details about an imaginary future
relationship in which they are a part. I organized this study in an attachment framework,
expecting differential results predictable by a participant’s attachment orientation.
Broadly, I expected the data to reveal that secure individuals experience an emotional
openness to the memory they recalled while remaining steadfast in their positive and hopeful
anticipations of a future relationship, resilient to negative emotions and cognitions. For
dismissive individuals, I predicted emotional indifference and distancing, followed by
stubborn negativity in their forecasts. Finally, for preoccupied individuals, I expected
hyperactivated state emotions would lead to congruent changes in future relationship
forecasts, the results of fearful attention to relationship information. Below, I discuss these
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predictions in detail. I will then discuss the results as they relate to one another in
combination and their broader implications. Finally, I will address limitations of this study
and make recommendations for future directions in this line of research.
Hypotheses Discussion
Hypothesis 1. I made a series of attachment group-specific hypotheses regarding how
positive and negative mood would change from before recalling an emotional relationship
memory to after. My investigation yielded mixed results concerning my hypotheses.
Secure group. For secure individuals, I expected their lack of defensive processing
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Rholes, Simpson, & Orina, 1999) to result in conditioncongruent mood changes. In other words, I expected secure participants to report increased
positive mood and decreased negative mood after recalling a positive memory and decreased
positive mood and increased negative mood after recalling a negative memory. Although I
found support for this prediction in the negative memory condition, secure individuals’ mood
remained unchanged after recalling a positive memory condition. I suspect recalling a
positive relationship memory did not affect secure individuals’ positive mood because the
task of recalling and writing about a positive memory activated cognitive resources that
quieted mood responses. Further, positive memories from a past relationship could have
made secure individuals wistful, removing some of the positivity from the memory. An
attachment-specific reason for this effect could be that positive relationship memories are
congruent with secure working models (Pereg & Mikulincer, 2004). Therefore, recalling a
positive memory might not emotionally affect secure individuals. However, working modelincongruent memories (i.e., negative ones, for secure individuals), in combination with the
absence of defensive filtering, lead to memory-congruent mood changes.
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Dismissive group. Because of their defensive self-distancing from emotion and
relationship information (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995;
Fraley & Brumbaugh, 2007), I did not expect dismissive participants to respond emotionally
to recalling either a positive or negative relationship memory. Indeed, dismissive participants
did not report any change in negative mood resulting from the recall of either valence of
memory. However, dismissive individuals did report decreases in positive mood in both
memory conditions. This decrease in positive mood could be in part due to wistful feelings
and concentration on the experimental task, but I also suspect an attachment-specific reason.
In engaging with relationship information of either valence, I suspect that dismissive working
models attenuated positive mood in efforts to create emotional distance from the troubling
stimuli (Gentzler & Kerns, 2006).
Preoccupied group. Hypervigilance to relationship information and emotional
volatility, often marked by negative moods stemming from their insecurity, are common
descriptors for the internal states of attachment preoccupation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).
For these reasons, I expected preoccupied participants to experience increases in negative
mood and decreases in positive mood in both conditions. I found some support for this
prediction as well. In the negative memory condition, preoccupied participants did report
decreases in positive mood and increases in negative mood. Preoccupied participants also
reported decreases in positive mood in the positive memory condition, but experienced no
change in negative mood. Although I predicted increases in positive mood after recalling a
positive memory, this result is also unsurprising. Preoccupied individuals, despite deeply
considering a positive event, still must overcome their dispositional negative moods
experienced in response to relationship information. A nullification of positive mood in this
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scenario makes sense. Further, if pining over positive memories of the past were to affect any
attachment group, it would be the ruminative preoccupied. Because preoccupied individuals
observe negative relationship information especially closely (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010;
Simpson, Collins, Tran, & Haydon, 2007), the focus of their attention might not have been on
the positivity of the memory, but rather on the fact that the memory was from a relationship
that (for one reason or another) ended.
Hypothesis 2. My second hypothesis made predictions on how ratings of positive and
negative mood shifts from before to after recalling a relationship memory would compare
between attachment groups within a given memory condition. I expected each attachment
group’s mood changes to compare in the same manner that their attention to relationship
information does (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010; Simpson & Rholes, 2012). That is, I expected
secure individuals to report relatively more positive mood changes after recalling a positive
relationship memory, preoccupied individuals to report relatively more negative mood
changes after recalling a negative relationship memory, and for dismissive individuals’
indifference to relationship information to place them in the middle of relative positive and
negative mood changes regardless of memory recalled. Instead, I found that participants of
different attachment groups did not differ in how recalling a positive or negative relationship
memory affected their mood. I suspect this result is due to the restricting structure of the
narrative probe. I asked participants to think about their relationship memory for two minutes
before advancing to a screen that demanded ten minutes of writing before participants could
advance. I also had explicit instructions for engaging with and writing about their memory. I
designed the probe with the intent of ensuring that relationship memories would be salient in
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participants’ minds during the forecasting portion of the study, but the probe seems to have
removed variability in attachment-dependent mood changes in the process.
Hypothesis 3. I had specific expectations for how recalling a positive or negative
relationship memory would affect each attachment group’s relationship forecasts. My
hypotheses in this regard were the same for both RDF and PRAF forecasts, with one
exception: Although I expected the dismissive group to predict generally higher levels of
RDF than was typical, I expected them to predict generally lower levels of PRAF than was
typical. Below, I discuss the results for both forecast variables as they related to each
attachment group.
Secure group. For both PRAF and RDF, membership in the secure group forecasted
lower levels than average when controlling for memory condition. Moreover, this effect
remained constant regardless of whether secure individuals recalled a positive or negative
relationship memory. These results support my hypotheses for secure individuals. I suspect
these results are explainable by the robust and generally positive working models typical of
attachment security. If secure individuals’ default cognitions concerning relationship
information are positive, it follows that their forecasts would remain stable between
conditions: the positive memory is congruent with how they typically think, and their
overwhelming positivity contextualizes the negative memory, diminishing differential effects
in forecasts.
Dismissive group. The results for dismissive individuals did not uniformly support
my predictions. I expected that dismissive group membership would forecast higher levels of
RDF because of dismissive individuals’ generally negative assessment of relationships.
However, I expected that dismissive individuals’ relatively low attachment anxiety (i.e., low
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fears of rejection) would forecast lower levels of PRAF than average. Although I found
support for hypothesis regarding RDF forecasts, I found that dismissive group membership
was not a predictor of PRAF ratings. I believe attachment avoidance and the generally
negative working models of romantic relationships dismissive individuals carry can explain
this result. Although dismissive individuals’ relatively low anxiety scores would suggest
definitively low PRAF levels, the nature of their insecurity – preference for self-agency
preservation – conflates with the positive outcomes of low anxiety to create an incoherent
prediction. That is, although dismissive individuals are not particularly concerned with a lack
of attention from their imagined future partner, they do not expect good outcomes from their
interactions in general.
I also found the dismissive group difficult to predict concerning how their forecasts
would differ between conditions. I expected that, with both forecast variables, dismissive
indifference to the experimental stimulus would result in stable forecasts across conditions.
Dismissive individuals’ ratings of PRAF supported this hypothesis, but their RDF forecasts
did not meet expectations. Instead, dismissive participants forecasted more relationship
dissatisfaction after recalling a positive memory than they did after recalling a negative
memory. The first meaningful revelation of this result is that it suggests dismissive
individuals engaged in the experimental task more than I expected. Foundational to my
prediction for dismissive individuals was the assumption that their defensive processing
would remove them from meaningful cooperation with the manipulation. However,
dismissive individuals’ RDF forecasts differed between conditions, indicating immersion in
the stimuli. It is further notable that the interaction stemmed from dismissive RDF ratings in
the positive memory condition. Considering dismissive individual’s engagement in the study
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and their reactivity to recalling a positive relationship memory in combination, a possible
explanation for this interaction could arise from the working model-incongruent nature of
recalling a positive relationship memory. Dismissive individuals, by definition, do not
engage in careful consideration of their past romantic relationship experiences. Doing so for
a positive relationship memory is likely rarer still. It could be that the novelty of engaging in
this exercise is unnerving, even threatening. Thinking of relationships in a positive light may
in turn activate their attachment systems and their negative attributions of their imagined
future partner. Meanwhile, the negative memory condition, although still requiring greater
attention to relationship information than typical, is at least in-line with the typical valance of
their disposition toward relationships.
Preoccupied group. Like the dismissive group, I found both support and opposition
for my hypotheses concerning preoccupied individuals. I expected preoccupied individuals to
forecast higher levels of both RDF and PRAF than the sample’s average. I reasoned that
preoccupied working models, defined by fearful hypervigilance and negative relationship
attributions, would make generally negative forecasts for future relationships. Indeed,
preoccupied individuals did forecast higher levels of PRAF than was typical. Given the
centrality of partner rejection angst to preoccupied attachment, this was not surprising.
However, I did not find that preoccupied forecasts of RDF differed from the average. I
suspect membership in the preoccupied group was not a significant RDF predictor because of
response volatility within the group. It is possible that, when controlling for condition in the
regression model, preoccupied individuals did not provide coherent RDF forecasts precisely
because memory condition affected their outlook in different directions.
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I expected preoccupied individuals would rate RDF and PRAF in alignment with the
valence of the memory they just recalled. I reasoned that preoccupied individuals’ tendency
toward hypervigilance and rumination with relationship information would result in
correspondingly more optimistic or grim forecasts, relative to the valence of memory
recalled. As expected, RDF forecasts did differ between conditions. However, it is
noteworthy that the negative memory condition was the source of the interaction. That is,
preoccupied individuals in the positive memory condition did not vary from the typical;
instead, those in the negative memory condition were deviant from the average. This effect is
likely the result of negative relationship information threatening preoccupied working models
(Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996). Because relationships are a central, obsessive concern
of preoccupied individuals, engaging in an exercise requiring personal and negative
relationship memories is likely to activate their attachment working models. Considering
preoccupied working models engage feelings of distrust and negative attributions,
preoccupied RDF forecasts were more negative after recalling a painful memory than after
recalling a non-threatening memory.
Although I expected PRAF ratings to differ between memory conditions in the same
manner as RDF ratings, I did not find support for this hypothesis. I suspect this stability is the
result of ceiling effects and demonstrative of the strength between preoccupied attachment
and a forecast variable so closely resembling their core sensitivities. Fear of partner rejection
angst is a definitive function of activated preoccupied working models. Memory valence was
likely not strong enough to alter the centrality of this construct’s effects as it was in RDF
predictions.
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Hypothesis 4. I expected to find within-condition differences in RDF and PRAF
ratings between attachment groups.
Relationship Dissatisfaction. In the positive memory condition, I expected that the
robust positivity of secure individuals would lead to lower RDF scores than both insecure
groups. Further, I expected preoccupied individuals to lower RDF scores than dismissive
individuals because of presentation of positive relationship information available for
impressionable preoccupied individuals to consider. I found partial support for this
hypothesis. I found that being in the dismissive group predicted higher RDF levels than
secure and preoccupied groups did. Secure and preoccupied RDF forecasts did not differ. I
expected that the positive working models of secure individuals would lead to more positive
RDF forecasts than preoccupied individuals. Despite my expectations that preoccupied
individuals’ outlook positivity would increase from recalling a positive relationship memory,
I still expected their foundationally negative relationship associations consequential enough
to cause forecast discrepancy with indomitably positive secure individuals’. Instead, it seems
that recalling a positive relationship memory allowed preoccupied individuals to forecast low
RDF to the same degree as their secure counterparts. This result suggests that preoccupied
individuals may use their own ruminative nature to their advantage. Clinging to positive
relationship memories seems to alleviate their insecurity, reinforcing positive associations
with romantic relationships and assumptions that future satisfaction is a likely outcome. Of
course, I did not test the longevity and efficacy of this effect here.
Following recall of a negative relationship memory, I still expected secure individuals
would predict more positive RDF forecasts than their insecure counterparts would. However,
I hypothesized that recalling a negative relationship memory would activate preoccupied
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working models and enhance their inherent negativity, resulting in their forecasts being more
negative than dismissive individuals’. I found partial support for these hypotheses. Although
secure individuals’ relationship dissatisfaction forecasts were lower than both insecure
groups, preoccupied and dismissive group forecasts did not differentiate. I suspected that
making salient a negative relationship memory would lead to activation of preoccupied
individuals’ attachment working models, defined by negative relationship assessments.
Although Hypothesis 3 results indicated this to be true, I expected this effect would be
dramatic enough to differentiate their negative memory condition forecasts from dismissive
individuals’. However, this result is not wholly surprising. Dismissive individuals also
maintain negative sentiments toward romantic relationships. Further, even though their postpositive memory relationship dissatisfaction forecasts were uniquely high, attending to
relationship information – even if working model-congruent – would not put dismissive
individuals at ease. I suspect the exercise of engaging in any relationship memory was
troubling for dismissive individuals, removing the possibility for unaroused dismissive
forecasts. For the singularly positive relationship dissatisfaction forecasts of secure
individuals, I suggest these results are indicative of the indomitable positivity of their
working models. That is, I think secure individuals’ categorically favorable appraisal of
relationships annulled the outlying negativity of their memory in this condition.
Partner Rejection Angst. I expected that secure and dismissive individuals would
predict lower PRAF scores than preoccupied individuals would. Unlike predictions of RDF, I
thought the centrality of PRAF to attachment preoccupation would neutralize any
considerable alleviation of PRAF fears by recalling a positive relationship memory. Because
of their shared low anxiety scores, I did not expect forecast differences between secure and
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dismissive individuals. I found full support for my hypotheses in this condition. Once again,
these results indicate secure individuals’ positive attributions for their partners and
preoccupied individuals’ fear of rejection, even following a positive memory prime.
I expected the same pattern of relation between the attachment groups in the negative
memory condition as I did the positive memory condition. I thought the memory conditions
would not be enough to alter forecasts, given the entrenchment of the concept of partner
rejection angst in attachment orientations. However, dismissive individuals’ PRAF scores did
not differ from those of either secure or preoccupied individuals’, contrary to my predictions
that dismissive and preoccupied PRAF projections would continue to differentiate. In
interpreting why preoccupied and dismissive PRAF forecasts did not differ, it is important to
recall that membership in the dismissive group was not a significant predictor of PRAF. I
would again suggest that dismissive indifference toward partner attentions, in combination
with the extreme differentiation between secure and preoccupied individuals, led to
incoherent dismissive PRAF forecasts, situated in the middle. However, I found support for
my expectations in that preoccupied individuals forecasted higher levels of PRAF than secure
individuals did after recalling a negative relationship memory.
Hypothesis 5. I expected that participants’ changes in mood would explain the links
between the memory conditions and forecast variables. However, no memory condition
within any group of attachment membership predicted positive-negative mood balance
scores. These results suggest that mood does not explain the link between a recalled
emotional memory and the quality of forecast. I expected mood shifts for both secure and
preoccupied individuals would be at least partially explain the relationship between memory
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recall and forecasts. I will discuss these findings with detail in the General Discussion
section, as these results are emblematic of broader themes concerning this study.
General Discussion
As addressed above, I framed the present study using attachment theory and
investigated the effects of recalling emotional relationship memories on mood and forecasts
of an imagined future relationship. I found partial support for my hypotheses, but also some
surprising findings, which I will discuss in concert.
For secure individuals, I expected to find condition-congruent mood reactions that,
even when negative, predicted positive forecasts of a future imagined relationship. This
prediction was somewhat supported. Indeed, for both forecast variables, Relationship
Dissatisfaction and Partner Rejection Angst, secure individuals reported relatively low levels
that were stable between conditions. This was despite condition-congruent changes in mood
that secure individuals experienced in the negative memory condition. However, secure
individuals experienced no mood changes in the positive memory condition, perhaps as a
function of the banality of positive relationship information to secure working models. It is
notable, however, that secure individuals were the only attachment group who did not
experience decreases in positive mood after recalling a positive relationship memory. I think
there are two attachment-related reasons for this. If mournful nostalgia were a reason for
insecure individuals’ decreased positive mood, this result could indicate that secure
individuals were more resilient to wistful reminiscence of their past relationship than others
were. Perhaps secure individuals were able to contextualize their lost relationship better than
insecure individuals could, resulting in relatively greater appreciation for the positivity of
their chosen memory. Overall, I conclude that there was support for my general assumptions
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concerning attachment security: the overall picture is one of adaptive stability and positive
outlook.
I expected emotional indifference and broadly negative forecasts of future
relationships to mark dismissive individuals’ experience. This too was largely supported, but
with notable exceptions. Regarding mood, dismissive individuals reported no change in
negative mood in both conditions, but also attenuated positive mood regardless of condition.
What is most interesting is the difference in RDF scores following dismissive individuals
recalling a positive versus a negative memory. There, the incongruent content of the positive
relationship memory to dismissive working models led to the highest forecasted relationship
dissatisfaction among all attachment groups in both conditions. One potential implication is
that it may be adaptive for dismissive individuals to incrementally expose themselves to
positive relationship thoughts. This process may acclimate dismissive individuals to thinking
of relationships in a positive manner, defusing the likelihood of their attachment working
models responding negatively to the incongruent stimuli. Otherwise, new, positive
relationship information might not be allowed to integrate into their working models because
their current working models respond so negatively. Although membership in the dismissive
group was not a significant predictor of PRAF (discussed above), the type of memory they
recalled obviously affected this group, as evidenced by their RDF responses between
conditions.
Hyperattention to relationship information and volatility in relational attributions
defines preoccupied individuals. As a result, I expected preoccupied individuals to
experience condition-congruent mood changes, as I did for secure individuals. However,
unlike secure individuals, I expected preoccupied individuals would allow their
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impressionable moods to affect their forecasts of a future romantic relationship. I again found
partial support for this overarching expectation. After recalling a negative memory,
preoccupied individuals did experience condition-congruent mood changes, as expected.
However, recalling a positive relationship memory led to decreases in positive mood and no
change in negative mood. Despite the incongruent mood changes (or lack of change at all) in
the positive memory condition, RDF forecasts were condition-congruent. That is,
preoccupied individuals forecasted more relationship dissatisfaction after recalling a negative
memory than they did after recalling a positive memory. This result suggests that, for
preoccupied individuals, focusing their ruminations on positive relationship information
might lead to forecasts that are more positive and, potentially, more positive relationship
experiences. Partner rejection angst ratings, in contrast, did not differ between conditions but
were generally higher than those of secure and dismissive individuals.
Considering the results together, pervasive themes arise. One notable theme is the
discrepancy of the accuracy of my predictions between the positive and negative memory
conditions. With few exceptions, my expectations for attachment-predicted mood and
forecast scores were coherent in the negative memory condition. In contrast, I found less
frequent support for my hypotheses for mood and forecasts following recall of a positive
relationship memory. I believe this trend occurred for a number of reasons. First, it is
possible that participants became wistful or pensive after recalling a positive memory from a
relationship they were no longer in. This could explain the occasionally unexpected mood
changes observed in the positive memory condition: the memory could simply not be wholly
positive, in context. Secondly, I think the difficult predictability of the positive memory
condition outcomes could harken back to the generally lower importance and salience of
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positive emotions and events. Isolating the underlying causes of some of my results in the
positive memory condition is more difficult if positivity is not impactful as it allows for
greater possibility that other, unquantified variables were in effect. Finally, I think that the
trend of unsupported hypotheses in the positive memory condition could be indicative of the
foundationally negative framing of adult attachment. Attachment researchers do not define
attachment security by the presence of adaptive and healthy relationship thoughts, moods,
and behaviors, but rather by the absence of maladaptive and unhealthy ones. This orientation
is important as it focuses on how individuals reckon with stressful relationship information,
but it may nonetheless lead to the clearest elucidation of predictions when framed in negative
contexts.
Another noteworthy theme concerns the inconsistent and somewhat incoherent role of
state emotion and the revelation that mood does not mediate the relationship between
memory recalled and forecast for any attachment group. Because there were differences
between conditions for forecasts not reconciled by mood, I take this to mean that other
constructs unmeasured in this study informed participant forecasts. Perhaps measures of state
general anxiety (Mohr, Crook-Lyon, & Kolchakian, 2010), stress (Simpson & Rholes, 2012),
or vividness of the recalled memory (Gaesser & Schacter, 2014) would explain the link
between memory valence and forecasts more clearly. However, recalling a positive or
negative relationship memory may not need a mediator. It may be that engaging in the recall
exercise activates internal working models informing forecasts on their own, perhaps by
virtue of shared brain structures (Gaesser et al., 2013), without a meaningful or observable
mediator.
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I also find it noteworthy, even surprising, that the quantitative aspects of memory
narratives did not differ by attachment. Although I designed the memory probe to be
maximally affective, with little room for variation (e.g., explicit instructions on the valence
of memory recalled, forced time to consider a memory, a minimum amount of time spent
writing about the memory), prior research suggests that narratives would present attachmentbased differences (Edelstein, 2006; Gentzler & Kerns, 2006; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995;
Pietromonaco & Barrett, 1997). However, attachment group membership did not predict
differences in narrative length, usage of positive or negative words, or participants’ own
ratings of their memory’s positivity and negativity. Perhaps qualitative analyses of narrative
themes (Nosko, Tieu, Lawford, & Pratt) would elucidate attachment-related differences, but
it may simply be the case that the narrative probe was even stricter than I hoped.
Limitations
Readers should consider several limitations when assessing the importance of my
findings. First, the relatively low number of individuals participating in this experiment left
my study statistically underpowered. With a larger sample size, I suspect that some of my
more ambiguous or unexpected findings would have been clarified. Indeed, many of my
unsupported hypotheses were not the result of unexpected significant results, but rather nonsignificant results.
Additionally, I think it is worth noting that, although defensible for my questions and
data, a categorical treatment of adult attachment orientations is not ideal. As with any
categorical approach, attachment classification reduces measurement precision and power.
Although most modern attachment research considers attachment as a continuous variable,
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discussions on the topic are ongoing (Fraley & Roisman, 2014; Fraley & Spieker, 2003;
Roisman, Fraley, & Belsky, 2007).
Methodologically, I recommend a repeated measures approach to collecting forecast
data in related future studies. By only measuring participants’ data following implementation
of the stimulus materials, I could not isolate the effects of the stimulus. Instead, measuring
forecasts before (perhaps discreetly) and after the manipulation would account for all of the
extraneous variables a participant brings into the lab, increasing internal validity. Further,
this study could have benefited from having some manner of control condition or conditions.
In my study, I cannot entirely attribute the effects to the fact that memories were emotional,
or that they concerned an autobiographical relationship memory. Conditions with nonemotional and non-relationship-related probes might further contextualize findings. I also
believe that an alternative statistical approach to analyzing mood as a mediator between
memory valence and forecast could yield interesting results. Instead of the traditional Baron
and Kenny (1986) approach to mediation, these data could be analyzed using multilevel
structural equation modeling (MSEM) as outlined by Preacher, 2011.
Conclusion
This study reveals patterns supporting the hypothesis that forecasts for future
relationships differentiate by attachment style and, to a lesser degree, are susceptible to the
influences of recalling an emotionally powerful romantic relationship memory. No other
research to my knowledge investigates memory as an antecedent of romantic relationship
forecasts, and none does so in an attachment framework, either.
In general, my results align with adult attachment theory (e.g., Hazan & Shaver,
1987; Simpson, 1990) and previous work independently investigating attachment’s role in
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memory (e.g., Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Philippe, Lecours, Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009) and
forecasts (Carnelley & Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Collins, 1996; Mohr, Crook-Lyon, &
Kolchakian, 2010). However, this work does not examine the veracity of participants’
relationship forecasts, nor does it measure the power which recalling an emotional
relationship memory influences behavior in a real world setting. Attachment theory proposes
that internal working models and the styles that define them should inform future relevant
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors into adulthood. However, research investigating this
hypothesis is only recently developing maturity and reveals somewhat mixed results (Conger
et al., 2000; Dinero et al., 2009; Miga, Hare, Allen, & Manning, 2010; Fraley et al., 2013;
Holland, Fraley, & Roisman, 2011; Parade, Supple, & Helms, 2012; Simpson, 1990). Future
research will have to investigate the specific role of attachment-delineated relationship
forecasts predicting tangible relationship outcomes. Should convincing links arise indicating
the predictive validity of relationship forecasts, understanding how these forecasts might
differentiate by attachment and be subsequently altered – perhaps through attention to
selected relationship memories – could be of value in developing treatment programs and
interventions.
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Figure 1
Attachment Clusters Demarcated by Participant Locations on Anxiety and Avoidance
Dimensions
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Figure 2

Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor Scores Predicted by Attachment
Group after Recalling a Positive or Negative Romantic Relationship
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Figure 3

Partner Rejection Angst Factor Scores Predicted by Attachment
Group after Recalling a Positive or Negative Romantic Relationship
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Attachment Clusters
Attachment Cluster
Statistic
Secure

Dismissive

Preoccupied

M (SD) for Anxiety

2.76 (.63)

3.22 (.83)

4.92 (1.18)

M (SD) for Avoidance

2.15 (.44)

4.19 (.78)

3.07 (.95)

50

40

43

37.6%

30.1%

32.3%

n
% of N
Note:

Participants rated items on 7-point Likert scales.
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Table 2
Factor Pattern (and Structure) Coefficients of Positive and Negative Mood
Factor
Item
Upset
Dissatisfied with
self
Afraid
Angry at self
Disgusted
Ashamed
Irritable
Angry
Alone
Scared
Downhearted
Lonely
Blue
Scornful
Sad
Frightened
Distressed
Nervous
Blameworthy
Guilty
Disgusted with self
Shaky
Loathing
Hostile
Jittery

Note:

Negative
Mood
.791 (.791)

Positive
Mood
.001 (-.299)

.747 (.772)
.725 (.645)
.713 (.721)
.710 (.695)
.704 (.730)
.695 (.673)
.690 (.711)
.689 (.726)
.684 (.654)
.683 (.732)
.670 (.727)
.665 (.689)
.664 (.603)
.655 (.706)
.651 (.569)
.643 (.647)
.642 (.575)
.640 (.647)
.608 (.592)
.591 (.608)
.515 (.453)
.513 (.571)
.512 (.553)
.469 (.347)

Factor
Item
Enthusiastic

Negative
Mood
-.047 (-.351)

Positive
Mood
.803 (.821)

-.066 (-.349)

Bold

.060 (-.244)

.803 (.781)

.210 (-.064)
-.022 (-.291)
.039 (-.229)
-.069 (-.335)
.057 (-.206)
-.055 (-.317)
-.097 (-.358)
.077 (-.181)
-.129 (-.388)
-.151 (-.405)
-.065 (-.316)
.163 (-.088)
-.135 (-.383)
.218 (-.028)
-.009 (-.253)
.178 (-.065)
-.018 (-.261)
.044 (-.186)
-.046 (-.270)
.165 (-.030)
-.151 (-.345)
-.107 (-.301)
.322 (.144)

Excited
Energetic
Joyful
Inspired
Delighted
Lively
Interested
Cheerful
Alert
Happy
Proud
Daring
Attentive
Strong
Determined
Active
Fearless
Confident

.015 (-.286)
-.112 (-.412)
-.120 (-.412)
.147 (-.138)
-.117 (-.395)
-.139 (-.413)
.102 (-.169)
-.107 (-.377)
.233 (-.035)
-.137 (-.403)
.134 (-.127)
.202 (-.058)
.058 (-.195)
.043 (-.208)
.091 (-.150)
-.096 (-.335)
.143 (-.084)
-.243 (-.457)

.795 (.790)
.793 (.835)
.773 (.818)
.755 (.700)
.733 (.778)
.724 (.777)
.716 (.678)
.713 (.754)
.706 (.618)
.705 (.756)
.688 (.637)
.686 (.610)
.670 (.648)
.662 (.646)
.636 (.601)
.631 (.668)
.600 (.546)
.566 (.658)

Uses principal component analysis with promax rotation. Bold numbers indicate

item groupings by factor.
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Table 3
Factor Pattern (and Structure) Coefficients of Forecasted Relationship Qualities
Factor
Scale / Item

Relationship
Dissatisfaction

Partner
Rejection
Angst
.190 (.014)
.115 (.259)
.095 (.247)
.110 (-.064)

Discussion communication
-.776 (-.732)
Communication avoidance
.632 (.658)
Aversive communication
.669 (.690)
Relationship satisfaction
-.767 (-.742)
Negativity of partner’s attributed thoughts
.077 (.252)
.771 (.789)
following an argument
Negativity of participant’s attributed thoughts
.054 (.213)
.697 (.709)
following an argument
Forecasted attachment avoidance
-.121 (.064)
.813 (.786)
Likelihood of breakup
-.003 (.144)
.649 (.648)
Partner infidelity
.064 (.201)
.601 (.616)
Participant infidelity
.470 (.461)
-.040 (.066)
Conflict expectations resulting from partner
.313 (.369)
.244 (.315)
wanting to spend an evening by himself/herself
Conflict expectation resulting from partner
-.145 (-.005)
.615 (.582)
leaving participant standing alone at a party
Distress from partner not responding when
-.055 (.125)
.792 (.780)
participant wants to cuddle
Distress from partner not comforting participant
-.149 (.019)
.738 (.704)
when participant is feeling down
Distress from partner wanting to spend an
.176 (.308)
.581 (.621)
evening by himself/herself
Distress from partner leaving participant standing
.013 (.186)
.762 (.765)
alone at a party
Forecasted attachment anxiety
.217 (.371)
.678 (.727)
Note: Uses principal component analysis with promax rotation. Bold numbers indicate
item groupings by factor. Participants rated each item/scale while imagining they were in a
committed romantic relationship five years into the future and one year into the relationship.
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Table 4
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Zero-order Correlations Predicting Linguistic
Content Narrative Variables
Word Count
Predictor
Memory
Condition
Secure
Main

cluster

effects

Dismissive
cluster
Preoccupied
cluster
Secure X
condition

Interaction Dismissive
terms

X condition
Preoccupied
X condition

Note:

Unstandardized

Positive Word Usage

Negative Word Usage

Zero-order Unstandardized Zero-order Unstandardized Zero-order

coefficient

correlation

coefficient

correlation

coefficient

correlation

39.29

.10

-1.86***

-.52***

1.46***

.55***

3.55

.01

.18

.08

.01

.00

-27.14

-.09

-.05

.01

.15

.05

21.12

.08

-.16

-.09

-.15

-.05

3.77

-.01

.20

-.17

.20

.30***

11.74

-.01

-.43

-.26**

.02

.27**

56.83

.15

.17

-.26**

-.25

.16

R2 from final model for Word Count = .03. R2 from final model for Positive Word

Usage = .28. R2 from final model for Negative Word Usage = .31. Regression coefficients
computed from effect-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition variables.
Regression coefficients extracted from first model in which predictor was entered. Zero-order
correlations computed from dummy-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition
variables. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
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Table 5
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Zero-order Correlations Predicting Participant
Ratings of Memory Positivity and Negativity

Predictor
Memory
Condition
Secure cluster

Participant Ratings of

Participant Ratings of

Memory Positivity

Memory Negativity

Unstandardized

Zero-order

Unstandardized

Zero-order

coefficient

correlation

coefficient

correlation

-4.79***

-.88***

4.36***

.82***

-.06

-.01

-.18

-.06

.03

-.03

-.14

-.06

.04

-.03

.34

.12

-.18

-.44***

-.44

.31***

.24

-.33***

.19

.32***

-.01

-.39***

.33

.45***

Main
Dismissive

effects

cluster
Preoccupied
cluster
Secure X
condition
Interaction

Dismissive X

terms

condition
Preoccupied
X condition

Note:

R2 from final model for Participant Ratings of Memory Positivity = .77. R2 from

final model for Participant Ratings of Memory Negativity = .69. Regression coefficients
computed from effect-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition variables.
Regression coefficients extracted from first model in which predictor was entered. Zero-order
correlations computed from dummy-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition
variables. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
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Table 6
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Memory Narrative Variables for Full Sample and
Attachment Clusters in Both Memory Conditions
Positive Memory Condition

Sample

Word
Count

Positive

Negative

Emotion

Emotion

Words

Words

Participant

Participant

Ratings of

Ratings of

Memory

Memory

Positivity

Negativity

Full Sample

278 (170)

3.89 (1.93)

.95 (.88)

6.59 (.98)

1.52 (1.35)

Secure

312 (238)

3.96 (2.01)

.86 (.88)

6.63 (.88)

1.50 (1.56)

Dismissive

245 (112)

4.04 (1.92)

1.09 (.93)

6.50 (.61)

1.30 (.73)

Preoccupied

268 (104)

3.63 (1.93)

.94 (.88)

6.63 (1.38)

1.68 (1.60)

Negative Memory Condition

Sample

Word
Count

Positive

Negative

Emotion

Emotion

Words

Words

Participant

Participant

Ratings of

Ratings of

Memory

Memory

Positivity

Negativity

Full Sample

319 (232)

2.02 (1.12)

2.40 (1.29)

1.80 (1.55)

5.90 (1.64)

Secure

294 (133)

2.30 (1.22)

2.52 (1.45)

1.65 (1.57)

5.50 (1.92)

Dismissive

296 (149)

1.75 (1.01)

2.57 (1.48)

1.95 (1.61)

5.85 (1.53)

Preoccupied

364 (346)

1.93 (1.07)

2.15 (.92)

1.83 (1.52)

6.38 (1.31)

Note:
scale.

Participants rated the positivity and negativity of their memories on a 7-point Likert
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Table 7
Repeated-measures ANOVA Results for Positive and Negative Mood in Positive Memory
Condition by Sample
Pre-

Post-

manipulation

manipulation

M (SD)

M (SD)

Positive

2.95 (.61)

2.72 (.62)

12.29

.835

.001**

.165

63)

Negative

1.60 (.48)

1.61 (.66)

.03

1.00

.866

.000

Secure (N =

Positive

2.99 (.71)

2.90 (.64)

.96

.960

.338

.040

24)

Negative

1.47 (.49)

1.34 (.47)

4.91

.824

.037†

.176

Dismissive

Positive

2.88 (.53)

2.62 (.62)

9.63

.664

.006*

.336

(N = 20)

Negative

1.58 (.40)

1.63 (.72)

.228

.988

.639

.012

Preoccupied

Positive

2.98 (.57)

2.58 (.57)

5.74

.758

.028*

.242

(N = 19)

Negative

1.79 (.49)

1.93 (.67)

.89

.953

.357

.047

Sample

Total

Mood

F

Wilk’s
λ

p

Partial
η2

Sample (N =

Note:

† = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 after Benjamini-Hochberg

correction for false discovery rate. Variables discriminate more the closer Wilk’s λ is to zero.
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Table 8
Repeated-measures ANOVA Results for Positive and Negative Mood in Negative Memory
Condition by Sample

Sample

Total Sample
(N = 70)
Secure (N =
26)
Dismissive
(N = 20)
Preoccupied
(N = 24)

Note:

Pre-

Post-

manipulation

manipulation

M (SD)

M (SD)

Positive

3.02 (.68)

2.47 (.93)

66.46

.509

<.001***

.491

Negative

1.58 (.56)

1.86 (.68)

21.64

.761

<.001***

.239

Positive

3.28 (.71)

2.72 (1.01)

24.87

.501

<.001***

.499

Negative

1.44 (.41)

1.69 (.53)

10.50

.704

.003**

.296

Positive

2.72 (.63)

2.31 (.88)

12.43

.605

.002**

.395

Negative

1.50 (.55)

1.65 (.59)

1.59

.923

.223

.077

Positive

2.98 (.59)

2.35 (.74)

29.57

.438

<.001***

.562

Negative

1.79 (.66)

2.22 (.76)

13.16

.636

.001**

.364

Mood

F

Wilk’s
λ

p

Partial
η2

† = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 after Benjamini-Hochberg

correction for false discovery rate. Variables discriminate more the closer Wilk’s λ is to zero.
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Table 9
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Zero-order Correlations for Variables
Predicting Levels of Forecasted Relationship Dissatisfaction and Partner Rejection Angst

Predictor
Memory
Condition
Secure cluster

Relationship Dissatisfaction

Partner Rejection Angst

Factor

Factor

Unstandardized

Zero-order

Unstandardized Zero-order

coefficient

correlation

coefficient

correlation

-.12

-.08

.05

.05

-.44***

-.46***

-.33***

-.30**

.41***

.36***

-.17

-.13

.06

.12

.53***

.43***

.02

.02

.01

-.01

-.51**

-.24**

.16

.06

.45**

.22*

-.16

-.05

Main
effects

Dismissive
cluster
Preoccupied
cluster
Secure X
condition

Interaction Dismissive X
terms

condition
Preoccupied X
condition

Note:

R2 from final model for Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor = .31. R2 from final

model for Partner Rejection Angst Factor = .20. Regression coefficients computed from
effect-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition variables. Regression
coefficients extracted from first model in which predictor was entered. Zero-order
correlations computed from dummy-coded attachment variables and mean-centered condition
variables. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Forecasts of Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor and Partner
Rejection Angst Factor for each Attachment Cluster in Both Memory Conditions
Positive Memory
Condition
Cluster

Secure

Dismissive

Preoccupied
Note:

Negative Memory
Condition

Dependent Variable

N

M (SD)

N

M (SD)

Relationship
Dissatisfaction

23

-.20 (.34)

25

-.30 (.46)

Partner Rejection
Angst

24

.24 (.73)

26

.30 (.82)

Relationship
Dissatisfaction

19

.93 (1.00)

20

.30 (.52)

Partner Rejection
Angst

20

.33 (.89)

20

.53 (.81)

Relationship
Dissatisfaction

19

.14 (.54)

24

.47 (.73)

Partner Rejection
19
1.19 (.77)
24
1.08 (.69)
Angst
Relationship Dissatisfaction Factor and Partner Rejection Angst Factor are created

from standardized variables.

